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1.1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
This case study examines the costs of conflict, and potentially CP, in the Balkan wars that 
took place during 1991-2001.  Cumulatively the cost of these wars to the international 
community amounted to $137bn in 2004 NPV terms, including humanitarian assistance, 
peace-keeping, military intervention and post conflict reconstruction.  The countries directly 
affected also suffered massive losses, including hundreds of thousands of deaths.  
 
The study retrospectively explores the possibility of preventing conflict from breaking out 
through the implementation of two CP packages.  The first is an economic assistance 
package in the late 1980s, designed to stabilise the macro-economic environment and tackle 
inequalities between regions and ethnic groupings.  The second is a package that involves 
both security guarantees and economic assistance, launched in 1991.  This includes the 
mobilisation of an external military force, backed up with economic assistance  These 
packages encapsulate, in broad terms, the most realistic and cost-effective possibilities for 
CP in relation to this conflict.  
 
The two Packages are shown to be cost-effective for the IC if they reduce the probability of 
conflict by 11% and 27% respectively.  If the benefits of peace to the directly affected 
territories and neighbours are also included, the breakeven probabilities are even lower, at 
1% and 3% respectively. 
 
A military-focused package would not have been realistic before 1991, because the political 
crisis had not yet developed to the stage (i.e. imminent independence for Croatia and Bosnia) 
at which military intervention became potentially legitimate.  At the same time, a package 
involving only economic assistance, but delivered only in 1991 onwards, would have made 
little if any difference to the descent into war.  
 
The cost of the military component of CP Package 2 is based on the deployment of a large 
NATO force, initially 50,000-strong, on the ground as a visible counter to the threat of 
aggression by Yugoslavia against Croatia and Bosnia, as well as a contribution to intra-state 
peace enforcement.  It assumes that some element of actual war-fighting would have been 
needed. In practice, however, a much smaller deployment might have been sufficient to 
dissuade aggression before it started, and to provide an environment in which all internal 
parties to the Croatian and Bosnian conflicts could have negotiated peaceful internal 
settlements.  If this had been the case, the size and duration of the military deployment could 
have been significantly less, reducing the cost of the security component by 50% and 
reducing the total cost of this Package by around a third. 
 
1.2 INTRODUCTION 
 
The key questions to be addressed in this study are:  
 
• with the benefit of hindsight, what conflict prevention ‘packages’ could the 
international community have designed in order to minimise the probability of the 
conflicts that actually took place?  
 
• how much would have been saved if these packages had been implemented, given 
reasonable estimates about their costs, compared with the actual cost of conflict and 
post-conflict intervention.  
 
The first section provides a background to the conflicts. This is followed by an assessment of 
the levels of resources that the international community has committed to the Western 
Balkans since 1991.  The third part of the study provides two hypothetical scenarios for CP 
interventions that might have restrained conflict from breaking out. These CP packages are 
then costed and an assessment of their probability of success is made. 
 
1.3 PEACE AND CONFLICT SCENARIOS 
 
Conflict Scenario 
 
In the 1980s Yugoslavia faced a severe economic crisis, characterised by hyperinflation, 
growing inter-regional inequalities, and widespread industrial unrest. This in turn hastened 
the process of political fragmentation, the rise of nationalism and the descent into conflict. By 
1991, the combination of financial crisis and nationalist protests became too much. Following 
unilateral secessions by Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Macedonia, war erupted, resulting in 
the worst humanitarian crisis that Europe had witnessed since the Nazi era. Millions of 
refugees sought sanctuary in Western Europe, sparking a major crisis for EU asylum and 
immigration policies.  
 
In the initial stages of the conflicts in Croatia and Bosnia,  the violence was organised by 
politically ambitious thugs and paramilitary groups led by self-appointed warlords, backed by 
hard-line nationalists in Belgrade, that were fighting beleaguered ethnic leaders of equal 
nationalist fervour.  This mix of belligerents rendered traditional approaches to diplomatic 
peace-making efforts redundant.  The preventative toolbox of sanctions, diplomatic 
negotiations and ‘traditional’ peacekeeping operations (UNPROFOR) was rendered impotent 
by political actors who preferred to seek their political objectives through military means. 
 
The UN dispatched a 38,000 strong peace-keeping force (UNPROFOR) in 1992, but it failed 
to give the force either the mandate or capability for robust peace enforcement and several 
key military powers, including the US and Germany, failed to take part.  Largely as a 
consequence, the next three years saw a continuation of the conflict, with international action 
only able to reduce the extent of the suffering.   
 
NATO finally took decisive military action in 1995 which brought an end to the war.  The 
Dayton Peace Agreement was signed in November 1995 and a 60,000-strong NATO led 
Implementation Force (IFOR) was created, which was succeeded by SFOR.  It soon became 
apparent that early withdrawal would result in a resumption of violence and NATO troops 
remain in Bosnia to this day.  
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THE BALKAN CONFLICT AT A GLANCE
June 25, 1991: 
Croatia and Slovenia proclaim 
independence. War begins immediately 
and rebel Serbs backed by the Yugoslav 
army overrun 30 percent of Croatia’s 
territory.  
October 8, 1991: 
Yugoslavia asks for UNHCR’s assistance 
and two weeks later the U.N. Secretary-
General designates the organization as 
the lead humanitarian agency in the crisis.
January 2, 1992: 
The Sarajevo Accord establishes first 
lasting cease-fire in the war in Croatia. 
January 15, 1992: 
The European Community recognizes the 
independence of Croatia and Slovenia. 
February 21, 1992: 
The U.N. Security Council authorizes 
deployment of U.N. Protection Force in 
Croatia. It is later deployed to Bosnia. 
March 3, 1992: 
Bosnia and Herzegovina proclaims 
independence. Bosnian Serbs lay siege 
to the capital, Sarajevo and seize 70 
percent of the country’s territory 
July 3, 1992: 
UNHCR Sarajevo airlift, which becomes 
the longest-running humanitarian air 
bridge in history, gets underway. At the 
height of the conflict in the following two 
years UNHCR and other agencies assist 
as many as 3.5 million people throughout 
the former Yugoslavia. An estimated 
700,000 Bosnian refugees flee and 
another two million people are internally 
displaced. 
January 11, 1993: 
Peace talks on the Vance-Owen plan start 
in Geneva. 
February 27, 1993: 
Airdrop operations began to provide 
assistance to besieged enclaves. 
May 6, 1993: 
U.N. Security Council Resolution 824 
declares Sarajevo, Tuzla, Zepa, Gorazde, 
Bihac and Srebrenica as ‘safe areas’ but 
the military situation on the ground 
remains unchanged. 
July 11, 1995: 
 
 
November 21, 1995: 
Dayton Peace Agreement covering the end 
of hostilities and the return of refugees to 
Bosnia and Herzegovina is initialled and 
one month later the NATO-led 
Implementation Force deploys to the 
region. 
January 9, 1996: 
The longest humanitarian airlift in world 
history which fed Sarajevo for 3 1/2 years, 
ends. 
September 14, 1996: 
Bosnia and Herzegovina’s first post war 
elections confirm wartime hard-line leaders 
in power, dashing hopes for a speedy 
return of refugees. 
January 15, 1998: 
Eastern Slavonia, captured by the 
Yugoslav army in the early part of the war 
returns to Croatian sovereignty following 
the departure of the U.N. Transitional 
Authority (UNTAES). 
March, 1998: 
Fighting erupts in  Kosovo province 
between Albanian separatists and 
Yugoslav forces, setting off a new wave of 
displacement. By September 350,000 
people have fled abroad or become 
internally displaced. 
October 27, 1998: 
Yugoslav President Milosevic bows to 
NATO military pressure and agrees to a 
cease-fire and a partial pull-out of Yugoslav 
military and police forces from Kosovo. The 
OSCE sends the first of 2,000 verifiers to 
monitor the agreement. 
February 23, 1999: 
Tentative agreement on substantial 
autonomy for Kosovo reached in 
Rambouillet, France. 
March 24, 1999                                              
NATO air campaign begins 
June 3 1999                                                   
Serbs agree to withdraw forces from 
Kosovo  
June 9 1999                                                   
Military Technical Agreement signed 
June 10 1999                                                 
Air campaign is suspended. UN Security 
Council Resolution 1244 establishes 
international presence in Kosovo 
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Srebrenica falls to Serb forces setting the 
stage for the massacre of thousands of 
persons in the worst single atrocity in 
Europe since World War II.  
August 12, 1995: 
Croatia launches Operation Storm and 
retakes the Krajina area from rebel Serbs. 
170,000 Serbs flee. 
June 12 1999                                                 
KFOR enters Kosovo 
June 20 1999                                                 
Serb withdrawal completed 
Source: Refugees Magazine Issue 114 UNHCR (1999) and National Audit Office 1999 
 
 
The international community also continues to play a central role in the government of 
Bosnia, coordinated through the Office of the High Representative.  With significant 
economic assistance from the international community, the Bosnian economy began to 
recover, refugees returned to their homes and the prospects of renewed violence diminished.  
Even eight years after the cessation of hostilities, however, Bosnia is far from returning to the 
prosperity it enjoyed during the 1980s.  
 
Meanwhile, the simmering tensions in Kosovo that had been brewing since Milosevic 
rescinded the province’s autonomy in 1989, exploded into violence in 1998.  Serbian 
atrocities triggered the exodus of some 800,000 Albanians.  The refusal of the Milosevic 
government to sign the Rambouillet Accord provided NATO with justification for its war 
against Yugoslavia.  In March 1999 NATO began its air campaign which lasted 78 days, 
imposing billions of dollars worth of damage on both Serbia and Kosovo.  The formal ending 
of hostilities took place in June 1999.  The overall framework for the Kosovo peace 
settlement as articulated in UN Security Council Resolution 1244 of June 10 1999 called for 
the deployment of an international security force (KFOR) led by NATO which has the 
authority to use force to implement, the agreements between warring parties and the 
establishment of a civilian UN interim administrative mission (UNMIK) to serve as an interim 
government in Kosovo.  Some four years after the formal conclusion of hostilities KFOR 
continues to face localised violence and UNMIK continues to act as the government of 
Kosovo. 
 
The latest spate of violence broke out in Macedonia in February and March 2001, despite the 
presence of a UN preventative force (UNPREDEP).  The violence lasted several weeks and 
led to the outflow of 80,000 Macedonian refugees, mainly into Kosovo.  In June 2001 the 
Macedonian government requested support from the international community to broker a 
peace process.  Macedonian and Albanian political leaders signed the Orid Agreement on 13 
August 2001 and  in September 2001 NATO sent in Task Force Fox composed of 1,011 
troops, with a six month mandate to secure the peace.  NATO's mandate was extended twice 
until March 2003 when the EU assumed control of the peace operation in Macedonia.  While 
the security environment has improved, there remains an on-going need for a small peace 
keeping force to maintain a “secure atmosphere”.  In effect, Macedonia remains a country ‘at 
risk’ as does much of the rest of the Western Balkans region. 
 
Peace Scenario 
 
Yugoslavia in the late 1980s was widely seen as one of the most economically-successful 
socialist economies, having avoided some of more rigid elements of state centralisation and 
with significant economic links with Western Europe.  If large-scale armed conflict had been 
avoided in Yugoslavia during the 1990s, therefore, it is reasonable to assume that its 
economic and political trajectory would have been comparable in character to other countries 
in Central and Eastern Europe.  Either as a united federal republic, or as peacefully-
separated countries, most of the country could have expected to have met the conditions for 
 10
EU membership in 2004 (along with Poland and the Czech Republic) or 2007 (with Bulgaria 
and Romania). 
 
As in the rest of Eastern Europe, this transition would not have been without its problems, 
with considerable dislocation of inefficient state industries, significant and sometimes painful 
social reform and in all likelihood considerable political instability.  In this scenario, however, 
the attractions of market democracy, supported by  EU and NATO membership, would have 
provided a powerful incentive for governments to adhere to Europe norms and practices.  
With support from the international community, Yugoslavia (or its constituent republics) 
would have built democratic institutions and state capacity, contained the potential for conflict  
between ethnic communities and gradually improved the effectiveness of the security and 
justice sectors.  
 
The key to the avoidance of large-scale armed conflict in this scenario is to fashion an 
adequate response to the dangers associated with simultaneous transitions to 
democratisation and market economics in a society riven with inter-republican and inter-
ethnic inequalities and tensions.  If conflict could have been avoided in this key transition 
period, there are considerable grounds for optimism that the structural factors favouring 
peace:  the maturing of democracy, economic prosperity, prospects for European integration 
would have outweighed continuing inter-ethnic tensions.  The scenario might have involved 
either the continuation of a federal Yugoslavia, or, more likely, a Czechoslovakia-style ‘velvet 
divorce’.  In either event, however, it would have required the avoidance and/or containment 
of the turn to violence of leading politicians in 1990-91.  If violence could have been avoided 
at this time of maximum danger, it is assumed for the purposes of this scenario, future armed 
conflicts (e.g. in Kosovo) could also have been avoided or minimised.  
 
1.4 ADDITIONAL ANNUAL COSTS OF THE CONFLICT SCENARIO 
 
Additional costs to the directly-affected territories 
 
The directly-affected territories are defined here to include all the former republics of 
Yugoslavia.  Costs have included physical damage to infrastructure (roads, bridges, factories, 
houses, communications, etc), massive internal refugee flows, loss of human capital abroad, 
and (not least) hundreds of thousands of people killed or severely wounded.  As Table 1 
shows, Croatia is estimated to have sustained $21 billion worth of damage during 1991-94, 
Bosnia between $20 - $100bn between 1992-1996 and Serbia / Kosovo around $20bn as a 
result of NATO bombing in 1999.  
 
Table 1: Costs of war damage to directly affected territories 
 
Country Cost of War Damage 
in $m 
In $m 2004 prices 
Croatia1 $21,000 (1994 prices) 25,060 
Bosnia2 $60,000 (1995 prices) 72,000 
Serbia / Kosovo3 $28,000 (1999 prices) 31,000 
Macedonia $160 (2000 prices) 173 
TOTAL  128,233 
 
                                                 
1  Zvonimir Baletic et al, Croatia Between Aggression and Peace, AGM Zagreb, 1994.  
2  World Bank Group Bosnia and Herzegovina Country Assistance Strategy  FY00-0. Report no 20592 BIH, Washington DC , 
June 2000, See Annex 1. 
3  Marvin Zonis ‘The Balkan war’s high cost’ Boston Globe July 23,1999. 
 11
All of these estimates are highly tentative, both because of the inherent difficulties in 
measuring the value of capital stock and because of the particular difficulties of doing so in a 
war environment. A more satisfactory methodology may therefore be to seek to estimate the 
loss of national income by the directly affected territories over this period.  Trade investment, 
international tourism and capital inflows in the Balkans were all adversely affected during this 
period, and the regional economy was severely destabilised.  By the end of the war in 1995 
BiH’s economy had contracted by more than 90%, physical capital was extensively 
destroyed and GDP plummeted by 80%.4  Nearly half the population became refugees.  
Even before the conflict in 1999, Kosovo was the poorest territory in the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia.  Throughout the 1990s the region underwent a severe economic crisis 
compounded by the break up of Yugoslavia and the effect of international sanctions imposed 
on Yugoslavia.  From 1988 to 1995 Kosovo’s GDP contracted by 50%, falling to less than 
$400 per head in 1995.5  This was accompanied by a massive neglect of industry, mining 
and infrastructure.  During the months of conflict, homes and infrastructure were destroyed or 
damaged people were displaced and lost their jobs.  Most institutions virtually collapsed in 
the immediate aftermath of the conflict.   
 
A decade of international sanctions, poor economic management and a deterioration in the 
finance, infrastructure and business sectors as a result of the long years of conflict caused a 
fall in Serbia’s GDP of 40% from its value at the beginning of the 1990s.  The 1999 NATO 
bombing of Serbia then destroyed almost half of its industrial production, leaving at least 
30% of the country’s working population unemployed.  Eight of the bridges over the Danube, 
crucial for trade and communications in the region were bombed.  Damage to electricity 
supplies left many Serbs without electricity in the winter of 2000 resulting in a humanitarian 
crisis that required an urgent international response.  It has been estimated that the Serbian 
and Montenegro economy declined by 40% and unemployment rose to 30% as a direct 
result of NATO bombing, with the total cost of the bombing in terms of lost output being put 
at around $29.4bn.6  The conflict in Macedonia may have cost that country over $500m in 
lost revenue, as the Macedonian economy contracted by 4.1% in 2001 and grew by only 
0.1% in 2002.7
 
Yet these figures are incomplete and inconsistent. In order to come up with a credible 
estimate for total GDP loss for former Yugoslavia, Table 2 seeks to compare what national 
income might have been in the peace scenario with actual trends.  Total Yugoslav GNP was 
$58 billion in 1989 ($83bn at 2004 prices).8  In 2002, however, total GNI for the republics of 
former Yugoslavia totalled only $60 billion ($63 billion at 2004 prices), even after several 
years of recovery.9  We assume that, as in peaceful parts of Central and Eastern Europe, 
some initial decline in national income during 1989-92 would have been a consequence of 
the economic reform programme that we assume takes place in the ‘peace scenario’, before 
growth resumes at an average 5% per annum (comparable to those parts of Central Europe 
unaffected by conflict) after 1993.  Despite this, taking into account the sparse available data 
on national income levels during the 1990s, we estimate that the total income loss over the 
15 year period is $641 billion, as calculated in Table 1.  We also estimate the costs of 
additional military expenditure by the multiple parties to the conflict, which had to be met from 
the reduced national income available.  
 
This estimate does not account for the additional human suffering inflicted by war, including 
deaths, rape, serious injuries, and traumatisation.  Nor does it account for the continuing loss 
                                                 
4  World Bank Bosnia and Herzegovina Country Brief  2003 available at World Bank website www.worldbank.org  see 
Country Briefs. 
5  European Commission /World Bank , Office for South East Europe, Report on the Activities of the European 
Commission/World Bank Office for South East Europe 2002, Brussels, September 2003, www.seerecon.org     
6  IISS database 
7 IISS database 
8 IISS, Military Balance 1990/91.  
9  World Development Report 2004, p. 252. 
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of potential national income after 2003, as a result of the loss of productive capital and 
people during the conflict.  It excludes the additional costs of military expenditure during this 
period.  
 
Table 2: Costs to states of former Yugoslavia (at $bn 2004 prices) 
 
Year Actual 
national 
income 
Projected 
national 
income in 
peace 
scenario 
Resulting 
loss of 
national 
income 
Additional 
military 
expenditure 
(by all 
parties) 
1989 83 83 - - 
1990 75 77 2 2 
1991 45 70 25 10 
1992 35 68 33 10 
1993 25 70 45 8 
1994 25 74 49 8 
1995 25 77 52 8 
1996 35 81 46 6 
1997 45 85 40 6 
1998 50 89 39 6 
1999 40 94 54 8 
2000 48 98 50 1 
2001 54 103 49 - 
2002 57 109 52 - 
2003 63 114 51 - 
Total   587 73 
 
Additional costs to the neighbouring countries 
 
Most of the spill-over effects of the conflicts in former Yugoslavia during the 1990s were felt 
by other ex-Yugoslav states, with Macedonia (for example) suffering from the effects of the 
conflict in Kosovo.  But Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania and Albania also suffered significantly 
as a result of disrupted transport links, reduced opportunities for cross-border trade and 
reductions in foreign direct investment and tourism.  Albania, Bulgaria and Romania were the 
worst hit.  Their economies declined by about 5% as a direct consequence of the war in 
Kosovo and their balance of payments deficits increased by about $2bn in 1999-2000.10  It 
has been estimated that the disruption to trade as a result of the destruction of bridges 
across the Danube has cost around $900m per annum.11  Much of the decline in national 
income in these countries may have taken place in any case as a result of other factors (not 
least the unreality of production statistics in the communist period).  It is reasonable to 
assume that part of the decline was due to the effects of the conflicts on almost all economic 
indicators, the economies of the SEE region have lagged behind the development of 
economies of Central Europe and the Baltics.  In the absence of conflict, therefore, we 
assume annual growth of 5% per annum after 1994. 
                                                 
10  Marvin Zonis The Balkan war’s high cost Boston Globe July 23, 1999  
11 Estimates by Yugoslav economists quoted by BBC Kosovo war cost £30bn , October 15 1999 available at 
www.bbc.co.uk/news 
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Table 3: Loss of national income to neighbouring states (at $bn 2004 prices) 
 
Year Actual national 
income 
Projected national 
income in peace 
scenario 
Resulting loss of 
national income 
1989 110 110 - 
1990 100 100 - 
1991 90 93 3 
1992 90 93 3 
1993 89 95 6 
1994 90 98 8 
1995 90 103 13 
1996 95 108 13 
1997 100 113 13 
1998 105 119 14 
1999 100 125 25 
2000 105 131 26 
2001 108 138 30 
2002 113 145 32 
2003 118 152 34 
Total   216 
 
Includes Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria and Albania. 
 
Additional direct costs to the wider international community in providing emergency 
assistance: 
 
The total additional direct costs to the wider international community may have amounted to 
$68bn between 1989 and 2003, represented by $42.8bn of emergency humanitarian 
assistance, and $25.3bn in post-conflict reconstruction and development costs. 
 
Emergency assistance 
 
In the 1991 war in Croatia some 500,000 Croats and other non- Serbs fled from parts of 
Croatia overrun by Serb forces.12  Some 2.2 million people were displaced in Bosnia, from 
1992-1995. And in Kosovo some 860,000 ethnic Albanians fled or were deported to 
neighbouring states in 1999. Over 200,000 people died, 20,000 are still missing, and 3.5 
million people were displaced from their homes and communities. To this day 1.3 million 
people still remain displaced. The UNHCR was responsible for the massive humanitarian 
operation that provided support and shelter for a total of 3.5 million refugees and IDPs. 
$3.2bn in total was channelled through the UNHCR for the provision of water, food and 
shelter for 2 million affected people. That amounts to $1,600 per refugee, representing the 
highest level of per capita relief in the UNHCR’s history. The need for humanitarian 
assistance declined somewhat in 1996 and 1997 as NATO’s involvement began to stabilise 
the situation. UNHCR outlays for refugees in the Balkans amounted to $550 million in 1996 
and $500m during 1997. Between 1999-2003 ECHO provided $196m for humanitarian 
                                                 
12  UNHCR  The Balkans  UNHCR, Geneva ,2003  www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/teexis/vtx/balkans 
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assistance to Serbia and Montenegro (excluding Kosovo).13 Under the UNHCR returnee 
programme, two million refugees had returned to their countries and homes as of 2003, at a 
total cost of $660m. Some 1.3 million people are still displaced and continue to rely upon 
humanitarian assistance, either paid for by the UNHCR or host countries.  
 
The Kosovo crisis created another humanitarian crisis with around 1.3 million people 
displaced, which included 860,000 refugees, who fled to neighbouring countries.  The 
UNHCR has estimated that it cost $389m to provide basic food shelter and protection for 
these displaced citizens in 1999 alone.14  
 
Substantial costs for refugees have also been borne by West European states, where 
hundreds of thousands of refugees fled.  European countries reportedly absorbed more than 
1 million Balkan refugees, with especially large numbers fleeing to Germany, Austria, 
Switzerland, Sweden and Denmark.15  It has not been possible to identify the cost associated 
with this absorption, except in the case of Germany, which hosted around 350,000 Bosnians 
and between 1993-1998 Germany spent a total of $7.5bn on refugee support: around $3600 
per head per year ($4400 at 2004 prices).16  
 
Table 4: Cost of humanitarian assistance programmes (at $mn 2004 prices) 
 
 
Year 
Refugee 
support in 
region 
 
Refugee return 
Refugees in 
Western 
Europe: 
hosting and 
return 
 
Total 
1989 - - -  
1990 - - -  
1991 500 - 900 1400 
1992 1000 - 2700 3700 
1993 1200 - 4400 5600 
1994 1200 - 4400 5600 
1995 1200 - 4400 5600 
1996 1000 100 3500 4600 
1997 800 100 3000 3900 
1998 700 100 2500 3300 
1999 1000 100 3000 4100 
2000 600 150 2000 2750 
2001 500 150 1000 1650 
2002 300 100 600 1000 
2003 300 50 300 650 
Total 10,300 850 32,700 43,850 
 
 
 
                                                 
13 See EU Serbia: Commission Successfully Concludes its Humanitarian Aid Operations available at 
www.europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/see/news 
14  Figure quoted in Larry Minear, Tedva Baada and Marc Sommer,’ NATO and Humanitarian Action in the Kosovo Crisis’, 
Occasional Paper Series, Institute for International Studies, Brown University, 2000. 
15  Reported in US Government Accounting Office European Security GAO-02-174, Washington, D.C. 2002, p58 
16  Talentino op.cit. p 43 
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Post-conflict reconstruction and development 
 
$15bn of development assistance was disbursed to the Balkans region between 1993-1999, 
of which the EU contributed $10.5bn.17  Since the Kosovo crisis Europe has donated a 
further $6bn to reconstruction and development efforts.  In the initial stages of reconstruction, 
priority was given to transport, energy, de-mining rebuilding of houses health education 
public works, agriculture and micro-credit.   
 
By 2000 the most basic post war reconstruction work was completed and donor attention 
focused on structural reforms critical to the emergence of a market economy.18  These 
included basic infrastructure rehabilitation, including roads, water distribution, repairs to local 
public infrastructure.  Further resources are now being allocated in order to focus on 
economic, social and institutional development.  The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe 
has so far spent $3bn (1999-2003) on these tasks.19  
 
Excluding the costs of humanitarian assistance, we therefore estimate the costs of post-
conflict reconstruction and development assistance to be as follows: 
 
Table 5: Cost of post-conflict reconstruction and development assistance  
 (at $m 2004 prices) 
 
Year Reconstruction Development 
assistance 
Total 
1989 - -  
1990 - -  
1991 -   
1992 500 - 500 
1993 1100 150 1250 
1994 1100 150 1250 
1995 800 200 1000 
1996 1500 500 2000 
1997 2000 1000 3000 
1998 1500 1500 3000 
1999 1500 1500 3000 
2000 2000 1000 3000 
2001 1600 1400 3000 
2002 800 1500 2300 
2003 500 1500 2000 
Total 14,900 10,400 25,300 
 
 
Additional direct costs to the wider international community in stopping the conflict after it has 
started 
                                                 
17  US Government Accounting Office European Security GAO-02-174, Washington, D.C. 2002, p 57. Between 1991-1999 the 
EU spent a total of Euros 19.3bn ($22bn at 2003 exchange rate) on assistance to the Balkans. This figure includes 
humanitarian assistance, reconstruction assistance, economic and financial assistance, balance of payment support and 
other activities such as demining and food security. 
18  See the World Bank Country Assistance Strategy 2000-2003 and Country Assistance Strategy Progress report of 
September 2001 for details of reform programme available from www.worldbank.org  
19  at http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/news/11-99/see-support.htm  
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The total cost of military operations intended to stop the conflicts in the Balkans amounts to 
$42.1bn, of which almost half ($20.47bn) was spent on SFOR and over a quarter (12.5bn) on 
KFOR. 
 
The UNPROFOR mission included 38,599 military personnel and cumulatively cost the 
international community $4.6bn for the duration of its mandate between  February 1992 and 
March 1995.  UNPROFOR was replaced in Bosnia by the NATO Implementation Force 
(IFOR) which fielded 60,000 troops in the region between December 1995 to December 
1996.  IFOR’s primary mission was to implement the Military Aspects of the Dayton Peace 
Agreement.  IFOR cost $5bn during its twelve month existence.  Its successor, SFOR,  cost 
$4bn in 1997 and $4bn in 1998.  The size of SFOR has declined from 32,000 in 1997 to 
19,000 in 1998 and 12,000 in 2003.  
 
The cumulative cost of IFOR/SFOR amounted to $15bn between 1995-1999.20  On-going 
expenditures on SFOR for the period 2000-2003 cost an estimated $5.47bn.21  
 
In addition to the NATO led forces three UN missions that had previously operated under the 
UNPROFOR mandate continued to operate independently of the NATO led operation.  The 
United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) which came into existence in 
March 1995 monitored the border regions of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
(FYROM)  Its mandate ended in February 1999 and cumulatively cost $149.5 million.22  The 
United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western 
Sirmium (UNTAES) was mandated to ensure security and stability in the South Eastern 
region of Croatia.  The UNTAES mission was terminated on 15 January 1998, with a 
cumulative costs for the period June 1996- June 1998 at $415.3 million.23.  
 
The additional cost of NATO’s military campaign in Kosovo is estimated to have been around 
$2.5bn.24  In total there were 60,000 NATO troops engaged in the Kosovo campaign in 1999, 
declining to 45,700 in 2000.  Allied forces contributed 38,000 troops to the Kosovo campaign, 
at a cost of  $4bn between 1999 and 2000.25 Since 2000 KFOR troop levels have been 
reduced.  As of August 2003 there were just over 22,100 KFOR troops reducing the 
annualised costs of KFOR’s presence to just over $1bn per annum in 2003.  NATO’s 
operations in Macedonia, Task force Fox and Allied Harmony, were funded through the 
KFOR budget. 
                                                 
20  Figure supplied in Andrea Talentino, ‘Bosnia’ in M. E. Brown and R. N. Rosecrance ‘The Case for Conflict Prevention’ in  
Michael E. Brown and Richard N Rosecrance (eds), The Costs of Conflict: Prevention and Cure in the Global Arena, 
Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, 1999, p27.  
21 This was calculated by using figures for US DoD incremental costs of its Balkans operations in US Government Accounting 
Office Balkans Regional Security and Projected Factor Affecting Regional Stability: Briefing Report to Chairman, 
Committee Armed Services, House of Representatives, April 2000 GAO/NSIAD-00-125BR, Government Printing Office, 
Washington DC, April 2000,and by calculating an annualised unit cost for SFOR forces other than the US troops by using 
UK figures supplied in  NAO report by the Comptroller and Auditor General Kosovo The Financial Management of Military 
Operations, HC 530 1999-2000 London, The Stationary Office, 5 June 2000 p13.   
22  Annualised figures provided in UN Department  Public Information UNPREDEP Mission Profile Un New York, 16 March 
1999 available at www.un.org/Depts/dpkp/dpko/co_mission/unpred_p.htm 
23  Annualised figures provided in UN Department for Public Information Croatia –UNTAES  available at 
www.un.org/Dept/DPKO/Mission/untaes_b.htm 
24  BBC News Online, 15 October 1999.  
25  A unit cost derived from UK estimates of incremental costs to the MoD’s contributions to the SFOR operation has been 
used as an approximation of the unit cost of SFOR. A unit cost of  $53,000 per annum was arrived at by dividing the force 
level of 10,500 into the MoD’s incremental level of  expenditure in 1999 of £342m and adjusting this figure to 2003 levels. 
This unit cost was then used to calculate the costs of the non-US force component of SFOR.  
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Table 6: Cost of UN / NATO military forces in Balkans (at $m 2004 prices) 
 
Year UN IFOR/SFOR KFOR Total 
1989 - -  - 
1990 - -  - 
1991 -   - 
1992 1600   1600 
1993 1600   1600 
1994 1600   1600 
1995 1000 1000  2000 
1996 100 5700  5800 
1997 100 4500  4600 
1998 100 3500  3600 
1999 100 3000 3500 6600 
2000 - 1800 2000 3800 
2001 - 1500 1600 3100 
2002 - 1200 1300 2500 
2003 - 1000 1000 2000 
Total 6200 23,200 9400 38,800 
 
 
Costs of the Conflict – Summary 
 
The measurable costs of the conflicts to the international community amounted to $106.9bn 
covering the period 1991-2003.  The costs are summarised in the table below: 
 
Table 7: Total costs of Balkans conflict to international community (2004 prices) 
 
Peace-keeping and military intervention $38.8bn 
Humanitarian assistance $42.8bn 
Post conflict reconstruction and development $25.3bn 
Total costs $106.9bn 
 
 
1.5 PROBABILITY OF THE CONFLICT WITHOUT CONFLICT PREVENTION  
 PACKAGES 
 
By definition, this is 100%, since the conflicts happened. 
 
 
1.6 CONFLICT PREVENTION PACKAGES 
 
There is a strong case to be made that if preventative action had been taken before mass 
violence had erupted, the prospect for success in preventing conflict in the Balkans could 
have been significant.  The international community used many direct CP measures such as 
 18
diplomatic and fact-finding missions, dialogue and mediation, military observers, diplomatic 
isolation, trade and financial sanctions, preventative deployments and the threat of use of 
force, but to little avail.  Partly, this was a function of its indecisiveness and its inability to 
apply direct measures effectively and efficiently, but it was also a function of its wariness 
about making a long-term commitment to the region without a clear exit strategy. 
 
Conflict Prevention Package 1: Economic Assistance before the crisis approaches its 
violent phase 
 
Central to this package is a sustained programme of economic assistance, starting in 1989, 
more than two years before the outbreak of large-scale conflict in late 1991.  Some authors 
argue that increased economic assistance for Yugoslavia during this period could have 
forestalled the descent into conflict.26  Such a package would have supported a high-level 
diplomatic engagement by the US and EU member states, determined to ensure that, 
whatever the political future of Yugoslavia, it should be determined solely through non-violent 
means.  Crucially, it would have been backed by a commitment to the medium term prospect 
of EU and NATO membership.  A broad process of conditionality would have been 
implemented in order to encourage improvement in human rights, democratic accountability, 
economic reform, the rule of law and the eradication of corruption.  Incentives to comply with 
conditionality could have included the prospect of trade access to the EU and technical 
assistance with the reform process.  This approach requires the sort of mechanisms that had 
been elaborated in the EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflict 27. 
 
The package includes a substantial rescheduling and partial write-off of external debts.  In 
1987 Yugoslavia debt servicing amounted to over 113% of its foreign reserves, and 
repayments had severely exacerbated the economic problems of the then federal 
Government.  A policy of rescheduling and write-off would have given Yugoslavia a breathing 
space from which to rebuild economic stability and security.  In the first instance, debt relief 
and balance of payments support could have helped moderate the decline in GDP, softened 
the trend towards growing inequality and provided crucial social support for groups 
disadvantaged by economic reform.  
 
Reducing Yugoslavia’s annual debt repayment obligations by half would have cost the 
international community approximately $300m per year (in current prices) through the period 
in question.  In any case, the level of debt repayment was soon to decline sharply as a 
consequence of debt default (as a result of war and sanctions) and, in the late 1990s, 
organised debt relief by the Paris Club and others.  The additional costs incurred by early 
debt relief as part of this CP package, compared with the conflict scenario, is therefore 
estimated to consist only of $300m for the years 1989-91: or $400m per annum at 2004 
prices.  In addition, we assume $600 million per annum of temporary balance of payments of 
support would have been given in order to ease the transition into sustainable growth by the 
mid 1990s.  This would have been repayable from 1996, at $200 million per annum. 
 
It is assumed that this package includes substantial amounts of development assistance, 
designed to increase investment in social protection and infrastructure in low-income 
republics (especially Bosnia and Serbia), strengthen social safety-nets, further the 
democratisation of security and justice sector institutions, and increase the role of civil 
society organisations.  More crucial than the absolute size of this programme, however, 
would be its allocation.  Indeed, given the continuing potential for intra-republican and inter-
republican conflict, it would be essential that the programme is managed in such a way as to 
achieve the objectives stated above.  
                                                 
26  Somnath Sen, ‘Debt Financial Flows and International Security’ SIPRI Yearbook 1991, Oxford, Oxford University Press 
1991, p 195 
27  European Union ‘‘EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflict’ Gothenburg, European Council, June 2001 
www.eu2001.se/static/eng/pdf/violent.PDF     
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In the absence of the destruction and economic decline caused by war, the total costs of 
such a programme would be as substantial as that now being provided to the republics of 
former Yugoslavia (currently amounting to around $1.5 bn a year).  Instead, we assume a 
programme of development assistance roughly equivalent in volume (though not in 
composition) to recent levels of EU pre-accession assistance to Romania, whose population 
of 22 million is roughly comparable to the combined population of former Yugoslavia.28  
Together with the concessional elements of debt relief and balance of payments support, we 
estimate the costs of this package to the international community at $11bn in 2004 prices. 
 
Table 8: Additional Costs of CP Package 1 ($m 2004 prices) 
 
Year Debt relief and balance 
of payments support 
Development 
assistance 
Total 
1989 1000 100 1100 
1990 1000 300 1300 
1991 1000 500 1500 
1992 600 500 1100 
1993 400 500 900 
1994 200 500 700 
1995 0 600 600 
1996 -200 600 400 
1997 -200 600 400 
1998 -200 600 400 
1999 -200 700 500 
2000 -200 700 500 
2001 -200 700 500 
2002 -200 700 500 
2003 -200 700 500 
Total 2600 8300 10,900 
 
 
Conflict Prevention Package 2:  Intervening as Conflict Starts with Security 
Guarantees and ODA   
 
This package assumes that the international community does not take the opportunity to 
begin a programme of large-scale economic assistance in 1989, but does decide to intervene 
in 1991 as the immediate threat of large-scale conflict becomes more apparent.  It assumes 
that the international community goes ahead with its recognition of Croatia and Bosnia.  
Since neither of these new states had the ability to provide for their own security, however, 
the international community also provides both with a security guarantee, both against 
external aggression (from Serbia) and from internal rebellion (from any armed groups 
seeking to promote inter-ethnic conflict).  In return, the international community would have 
required both governments to bring all main ethnic groups into government, support the 
rights of all citizens and press ahead with political reform.  
                                                 
28  EU assistance to Romania in 2003 amounted to ε700 million, and is due to rise by 40% by 2006 as EU membership 
approaches.  
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The international community would support these guarantees by large-scale economic 
assistance to all the republics of former Yugoslavia, including Serbia, provided that they 
refrained from aggression and supported a broad-ranging internal reform programme. 
 
Table 9: Additional Costs of CP Package 2 ($m 2004 prices) 
 
Year Balance of 
payments 
support 
Development 
assistance 
Security 
assistance 
Total 
1989 - - - - 
1990 - - - - 
1991 500 300 6000 6800 
1992 400 500 3000 3900 
1993 400 500 2000 2900 
1994 200 500 1000 1700 
1995 0 500 1000 1500 
1996 0 500 1000 1500 
1997  600 1000 1600 
1998  600 500 1100 
1999  600 500 1100 
2000  700 500 1200 
2001  700 500 1200 
2002  700 500 1200 
2003  700 500 1200 
Total 1500 7400 18,000 26,900 
 
 
In order for a security guarantee of this sort to have been credible, we assume that the 
international community would have had to mobilise a force with a robust mandate, 
significant US participation, and up to 50,000 well-trained troops on the ground, supported by 
air power if necessary.  Such a force would almost certainly have been sufficient to deter the 
JNA from attacking Croatia in October 1991, but if necessary could have defeated it in short 
order.  It would also have allowed the provision of internal security in both countries until new 
national security forces could have taken their place.  We estimate that some limited military 
action would be necessary in an initial phase, but that the size of this force could have been 
rapidly reduced once the immediate threat had passed, though this would have been 
contingent on political progress in Belgrade as well as Sarajevo and Zagreb.  On reasonable 
assumptions, the costs of such a force would have peaked at no more than $6bn in 1991 
(equivalent to the first-year cost of IFOR in 1996), before falling thereafter.  We assume that 
a smaller force would remain in being thereafter as a backup to national forces.  
 
It is also assumed that, as part of this package, the international community belatedly 
introduces the programme of economic assistance outlined in CP Package 1 above.  This 
programme would have been available to all the new republics, including Serbia and 
Montenegro, although in the latter case some degree of progress on the Kosovo issue would 
have been a condition for assistance.  Some additional balance of payments support is also 
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included.  Including these items, CP Package 2 would have cost the international community 
a total of  $27bn (2004 prices) over the 13 year period 1991-2003.  
 
1.7 PROBABILITY OF CONFLICT WITH CONFLICT PREVENTION PACKAGES 
 
Probability of Conflict with Conflict Prevention Package 1 
 
This package of early economic assistance could have prevented conflict by changing the 
behaviour and expectations of key actors well before armed forces began to be mobilised.  It 
would have reduced the probability of extreme nationalists prevailing in the power struggles 
that followed and eased the social tensions that fuelled their support.  At the same time, it 
remains possible that conflict would still have broken out.  The political crisis in Yugoslavia 
was longstanding, and cannot be explained simply by reference to economics.  It is not clear 
that external assistance, on its own, could have made a major difference in inter-republican 
or urban/rural inequalities, which were rooted in longstanding differences in factor 
endowment and productive structures.  Since this package does not include a commitment to 
security assistance, it would not have been unable to respond adequately to the emergence 
of a security vacuum in the newly independent Croatia and Bosnia in 1991 and 1992.  
 
Taking all these factors into account, we estimate that this package would have cut the 
probability of large armed conflict from what actually happened by 60% and/or reduced the 
extent and costs of such a conflict should it occur by a similar amount.  It would have had its 
clearest effect in stopping the Croatia and Bosnia wars, but in so doing it is assumed that it 
might also have helped prevent the seeds of the subsequent Kosovo war.  On the 
assumption of a 60% reduction in conflict probability, it would have led to net savings by the 
international community of $67bn in NPV terms, over and above savings to the territories of 
former Yugoslavia of $543 billion and savings to neighbouring territories of $98 billion.  Even 
if this package had only reduced the probability of conflict by 11%, it would still have ‘broken 
even’ for the international community.  
 
Probability of Conflict with Conflict Prevention Package 2 
 
Because it includes a strong military component, the second package is more expensive.  
Because of its more comprehensive nature, however, we assess that it would have been 
more likely to reduce the chances of large-scale war.  It is hard to believe that war could 
have broken out if NATO and/or the UN had deployed 60,000 troops by mid-1991.  In 
combination with a large-scale programme of economic and political engagement with the 
region, we assume that this deployment could have reduced the probability/cost of conflict by 
80%.  The main risk would be that the Kosovo war, with all its costs, would still happen, 
although we assess that it would have been made less likely because of the demonstration 
effect of international action in 1991.  On the assumption of a 80% reduction in conflict 
probability, it would have led to net savings by the international community of $72bn, over 
and above savings to the territories of former Yugoslavia of $724 billion and savings to 
neighbouring territories of $131 billion.  Even if this package had only reduced the probability 
of conflict by 27%, it would still have ‘broken even’ for the international community.  
 
1.8 NET PRESENT VALUE AND ASSESSMENT 
 
In practice, it is possible to think of many other possible CP packages, drawing on elements 
of the two packages set out above.  Yet these packages seem to us to encapsulate, in broad 
terms, the most realistic and cost-effective possibilities for CP in relation to this conflict.  A 
military-focused package would not have been realistic before 1991, because the political 
crisis had not yet developed to the stage (i.e. imminent independence for Croatia and Bosnia) 
at which military intervention became potentially legitimate.  At the same time, a package 
involving only economic assistance, but delivered only from1991 onwards, would have made 
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little if any difference to the descent into war.  A more robust military-led package in 1992 or 
1993 would have been better than delaying robust intervention until 1995, but it would have 
had no clear advantages, and many clear disadvantages, compared with the 1991 
intervention examined in Package 2.  
 
The two Packages are shown to be cost-effective for the IC if they reduce the probability of 
conflict by 11% and 27% respectively.  If the benefits of peace to the directly affected 
territories and neighbours are also included, the breakeven probabilities are even lower, at 
1% and 3% respectively. 
 
The cost of the military component of CP Package 2 is based on the deployment of a large 
NATO force, initially 50,000-strong, on the ground as a visible counter to the threat of 
aggression by Yugoslavia against Croatia and Bosnia, as well as a contribution to intra-state 
peace enforcement.  It assumes that some element of actual war-fighting would have been 
needed.  In practice, however, a much smaller deployment might have been sufficient to 
dissuade aggression before it started, and to provide an environment in which all internal 
parties to the Croatian and Bosnian conflicts could have negotiated peaceful internal 
settlements.  If this had been the case, the size and duration of the military deployment could 
have been significantly less, reducing the cost of the security component by 50%, and 
reducing the total cost of this Package by around a third.  
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2.1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
This case study looks at possible packages for the prevention of the prolonged conflicts in 
Afghanistan between 1989 and 2003.  It thus encompasses the departure of Soviet troops in 
February 1989, the post-Soviet Najibullah government that lasted until June 1992, the 
subsequent civil war that led to the dominance of the Taliban, the Taliban’s fall in November 
2001, and the subsequent post-civil war era, including the creation of an Afghan central 
government, up until December 2003.  The study makes estimates of the costs of these 
multiple conflicts, to the international community, neighbouring Iran and Pakistan and 
Afghanistan itself.  By far the biggest component of these costs relates to the impact that the 
ongoing Afghan war had on the global drugs market and on international terrorism, 
culminating in the 9/11 attacks.  
 
The study examines two possible CP packages, both of which involve support for a 
hypothetical peace accord between the Afghan regime and the Mujahedin groups in 1989-90.  
The first is a financial assistance package, totalling $15 billion (in 2004 prices) over 15 years.  
The second includes both UN military forces and an enhanced financial assistance 
programme, and costs $100 billion in total.  The main reason for the relatively high level of 
expense of both packages is that Afghanistan had already experienced a decade of civil war, 
had been heavily armed (on both sides) by foreign powers and was facing considerable 
obstacles to a negotiated peace.  
 
The retrospective case for the cost-effectiveness of CP in Afghanistan rests heavily on the 
assumption that Afghanistan’s war had a significant effect on the scale of international 
terrorism (including the 9/11 attacks) and/or the global drugs problem.  If such a relationship 
did exist, making even modest inroads into the costs of these global problems would have 
made CP worthwhile.  In this study, we assume that the creation of a peaceful Afghanistan in 
the 1990s would have reduced the probability of 9/11 by 50%, reduced the total costs of 
dealing with international terrorism by 20%, and reduced the total costs incurred as a result 
of the international drugs trade by 5%.  On these assumptions, both CP Packages would 
have been worthwhile to the IC at relatively low breakeven probabilities of success (7% and 
50% respectively).  
 
If these global costs are excluded, the retrospective cost-effectiveness of the packages to the 
IC is very low indeed and CP would not have been cheaper (for the IC) than letting the 
conflict continue.  
 
Finally, if the indirect costs to the IC are excluded, but account is taken of the high costs of 
conflict to Afghanistan and its neighbours, the first CP Package generates a modest positive 
return, but the second does not.  In the latter case, the sheer scale of the projected Package 
(involving an initial deployment of 30,000 troops, and the provision of a level of ODA larger in 
absolute terms than that provided to any other aid recipient) means that its projected costs 
would have exceeded the combined benefits to the IC, directly-affected territory and 
neighbours.  
2.2 INTRODUCTION 
 
This case study looks at conflict in Afghanistan between 1989 and 2003.  It thus 
encompasses the period from the departure of Soviet troops in February 1989, the post-
Soviet Najibullah government that lasted until June 1992 and the civil war in the post-
Najibullah era leading to the rise of the Taliban and its control over most of the country.  
Finally, it includes the Taliban’s fall in November 2001 and the subsequent period of the 
post-civil war era, including the creation of an Afghan central government up until December 
2003.  The study makes estimates of the costs of these multiple conflicts to the international 
community, to neighbouring Iran and Pakistan and to Afghanistan itself.  It then examines 
two possible CP packages, both of which involve support for a hypothetical peace accord 
between the Najibullah regime and the armed Mujahedin groups.  The first is an economic 
assistance package, totalling around $15 billion over 15 years.  The second also includes the 
provision of UN military forces and a much- enhanced economic assistance programme.  
The study estimates the reduction in the probability of conflict as a result of each of these 
packages and thus whether either of the packages could have prevented the resumption of 
civil war. 
 
Before 1989, there was significant international engagement in Afghanistan, both through 
large-scale military support to the Government by the Soviet Union, and by major Western 
countries, who assisted the anti-Soviet armed struggle of the Mujahedin groups.  Military aid 
accounted for the bulk of Western engagement, with humanitarian assistance for the 
operation of the Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan.  
 
Extensive military aid from both sides stopped in February 1989 when the Soviet troops left 
Afghanistan, although small-scale Western military assistance continued until 1992, when 
the Mujahedin groups overthrew the Kabul Communist regime.  Humanitarian assistance 
continued on an on-and-off basis until the Taliban's fall.  At the very end of the period, the 
Western countries directly intervened in Afghanistan in the aftermath of the September 2001 
terrorist attacks on the United States.  
 
2.3 PEACE AND CONFLICT SCENARIOS 
 
Conflict Scenario: what actually happened 
 
The period from 1989 to 2003 was one of almost continuous warfare in Afghanistan.  The 
Mujahedin war against the Soviet forces and the pro-Soviet Kabul government (which had 
begun in the early 1980's) lasted until June 1992.  This civil war took the form of war against 
the Soviet forces until 1989, when they finally withdrew from Afghanistan.  The Soviet 
withdrawal did not end the war, which changed its focus to one fought between the 
Mujahedin and the weakened Kabul regime.  The regime was further weakened in December 
1991 when the Soviet Union's collapse cut its only source of military and financial assistance.  
In June 1992, the Mujahedin forces captured Kabul, but the subsequent establishment of an 
Islamic regime ended the civil war only for a short while.  A coalition government consisting 
of the major Mujahedin groups representing rival ethnic groups failed to overcome conflicts 
over shares of government.  Civil war resumed late in 1992 and lasted until the Taliban's fall.  
 
The new round of civil war further devastated Afghanistan and created widespread hardship.  
The territories controlled by different groups expanded and contracted frequently because of 
constant fighting between and among them.  Unsurprisingly, there was a growing desire for 
an end to the Mujahedin era among the Afghans.  This popular demand for a strong central 
government coincided with those of countries (notably Pakistan) interested in a strong, but 
sympathetic, Afghan government. 
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The, primarily Pashtun, Taliban movement came to the political scene in 1994 with a promise 
to end the civil war, but its emergence intensified it as they sought to subjugate all other rival 
groups.  After two years of fighting, they captured Kabul in 1996 and pushed out the mainly 
non-Pashtun groups.  By that time, over half the country was under their control, but the 
territory to the north and west of Kabul was still controlled by Tajik, Hazara and Uzbek 
groups.  Then, in early 1999, the Taliban invaded northern Afghanistan, pushing its 
opponents into the 10 percent of the country dominated by Uzbeks and Tajiks, now formed 
into the Northern Alliance.  Iran and Russia became its main supporters, with backing also 
from India, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.  
 
In the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, the Northern Alliance, now reinforced by Iran 
and Russia and enjoying military assistance from the United States, recaptured most of the 
country, excluding the southern and south-eastern territories dominated by Pashtun tribes 
who, with American assistance, rose against the Taliban regime in their territories a few 
weeks before its demise in November 2001.  Since that time, various Western countries have 
contributed military assets to the coalition forces fighting the remnants of the Taliban and Al-
Qaeda.  The Western countries also helped the creation of a peacekeeping force, the 
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).  The 5,500-strong force has been a major 
factor in enabling the Afghan government to function in Kabul.  NATO took charge of the 
force in August 2003.  By February 2004, in addition, twelve ‘provincial reconstruction’ units 
had been deployed in centres beyond Kabul and a further four teams (led by UK, Italy, 
Turkey and Norway) are due to deploy by summer 2004.  NATO and allied countries have 
also undertaken to train and arm the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan police 
force.  
 
Non-military engagement has been reflected in efforts to establish a functional Afghan 
central government supported by all the interested influential parties.  Those efforts included 
the Berlin conference of December 2001, the negotiations between and among the anti-
Taliban groups and their main supporters (Iran and Russia) and also among Afghanistan's 
neighbours (Iran, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan).  They led to the 
convention of the Loya Jirga (grand assembly of influential Afghan figures) and to the setting 
up the constitutional Loya Jirga of December 2003, which adopted a constitution on 5 
January 2004.  
 
Gathered in the Tokyo donor conference of January 2002, Western (EU, USA and Japan) 
and non-Western (Iran, Saudi Arabia, India, Pakistan and South Korea) donors committed 
themselves to provide $4.5bn over a five-year period (2002-6) towards Afghanistan's 
reconstruction.29  A fraction of the 2003 approved budget of $87 billion for the operation of 
the US military in Iraq and Afghanistan was dedicated to Afghanistan, of which, according to 
unconfirmed reports, about $1.6 billion will be spent on development projects.30
 
Despite these efforts, Afghanistan remains riven with conflict.  The Government has not yet 
achieved control over much of its territory.  Al Qaeda and Taliban forces remain active in 
much of the country, and disputes between local warlords still frequently escalate into large-
scale armed conflict.  There is little doubt that a rapid withdrawal of international forces would 
again plunge Afghanistan into civil war.  Even with those forces in place, the prospects for 
avoiding conflict remain uncertain (as we explore in the prospective Afghanistan case study).  
                                                 
29  Council of Foreign Relations, "How Much Will Humanitarian Aid for Afghanistan cost?" Terrorism: Questions and Answers, 
2004, Accessed: 16 January 2004. 
30  Anne Carlin, " How to Spend Wisely in Afghanistan," The New York Times, 26 January 2004. 
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Peace Scenario 
 
This scenario outlines what could possibly have happened had the international community 
chosen to engage in Afghanistan during the period immediately after the Soviet withdrawal 
but before the capture of Kabul by the Mujahedin.  It assumes that unified pressure from the 
international community, supported by a package of incentives, would have led to a ceasefire 
between most if not all of the major parties to the conflict.  The reluctance of the Soviet Union 
and the Western countries to finance their respective allies after the withdrawal of Soviet 
troops, together with growing dissatisfaction at the costs of war by economically-exhausted 
regional mentors (Iran and Pakistan) could have provided an opportunity for such an initiative.  
Moreover, since the two sides were unable to eliminate each other in the foreseeable future, 
incentives for settlement increase further.  Although both sides violate the agreed ceasefire 
frequently, negotiations continue between 1989 and 1991, leading to a peace accord and the 
creation of a government of national reconciliation in 1991.  Under United Nations auspices, 
it provided for a power-sharing arrangement, for a general amnesty for both sides' supporters 
and fighters, for the release of their prisoners, for the demobilisation of most of their troops 
and the integration of the rest into a national military force and for elections in 1992.  
 
The peace scenario assumes that both the wider international community and Afghanistan's 
neighbours (Iran and Pakistan) are committed to using their political influence and economic 
means to persuade the parties to the conflict to end their hostility in favour of a peaceful 
negotiated settlement.  The scenario does not assume a total absence of hostility in the post-
peace accord era, and it is to be expected that some elements on both sides resort to arms 
to achieve their political, personal or criminal objectives.  The availability of a large number of 
small weapons, the dissatisfaction of many demobilised ex-fighters, poverty and high 
unemployment resulted in many small-scale politically or criminally motivated armed clashes.  
While some of these armed clashes develop into significant local conflicts, none of them 
escalate to the level of a large-scale civil war. 
 
This scenario assumes that, in parallel with the departure of Soviet troops from Afghanistan 
in 1989, a strong international CP effort (see below for more details) helps persuade the 
Mujahedin to accept negotiations with the Kabul Communist regime and to find a peaceful 
settlement.  While proven to be a force to reckon with, in 1989 the Mujahedin were years 
away from overthrowing the Kabul regime.  The two sides were both exhausted and 
concerned about the loss of foreign support as the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan 
deprived both sides of most of the material and financial support of their respective foreign 
supporters (in the Soviet Union and in Pakistan/ the US).  Afghanistan was economically 
exhausted, it had lost most of its limited and inadequate infrastructural, industrial and 
agricultural capabilities due to 11 years of heavy fighting, and there had been massive 
forcible displacement of the rural population of whom most lived in Iran and Pakistan as 
refugees.  Given the right political circumstances, a strong coalition of domestic interests 
could have been mobilised in support of a restoration of peace.   
 
A united commitment to a peace settlement by the international community is crucial to the 
plausibility of this scenario.  For the purposes of this exercise, therefore, it is assumed that, 
concerned about its enormous domestic problems and the gradual loss of its Warsaw Pact 
allies, Moscow would have backed the agreement.  It is also assumed that it would have the 
blessing of the Mujahedin's Western backers, who would have seen no merit in the civil war's 
continuity once their Cold War enemy was falling apart.  Finally, Iran and Pakistan would 
have blessed the agreement to end instability in their neighbouring country and to ease its 
heavy economic burden on them, including the cost of housing millions of Afghan refugees.  
Their respective Afghan protégés' participation in the emerging Afghan reconciliation 
government would have assured them of the latter's favourable policy towards them.   
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Finally, the peace scenario assumes the creation of a new national political system (probably 
involving some form of elections) that is broadly acceptable to the former enemies and that 
helps to initiate a progressive process of stabilisation during the period from 1992 to 2003.  It 
is assumed that a reconstruction programme begins to build a basic infrastructure, to 
rehabilitate agriculture to a significant extent and to establish a small industrial sector.  As 
discussed below, substantial international support would have been a key determinant of the 
success of such a programme.  
 
2.4 ADDITIONAL ANNUAL COSTS OF THE CONFLICT SCENARIO 
 
Additional costs to the directly-affected territory 
 
The human and psychological costs of years of devastating war are not directly quantifiable, 
but it is possible to estimate the annual loss for Afghanistan of national income as a result of 
the conflict scenario, compared with the peace scenario, during the period 1989-2003.  The 
World Bank estimates Afghanistan's GDP, presumably that of its formal economy, to be 
about $3.5 billion (at 2003 prices) in 1981.31  During the 1980s, its average annual growth 
rate was -2 percent, which rose to 4.6 percent during the period 1990-1998.  The end of the 
civil war and subsequent reconstruction activities pushed the growth rate to 30 percent in 
2002.32  For 2000, another source estimates the GDP to be about $4 billion, which is 
consistent with the mentioned pattern of growth.33  Given this situation, it is assumed that 
Afghanistan's annual income was $3.3 billion in 1989, which gradually grew, including five 
years of 0 percent annual growth, to about $4.0 billion in 2000 and 2001.  It then grew by 30 
percent in 2002 and by another 30 percent in 2003.   
 
In the case of the peace scenario, however, it can be assumed that national income would 
have grown rapidly in the period of immediate post-conflict reconstruction, not least because 
peace would likely have been accompanied by the return of between four and five million of 
its nationals, including most of its highly educated ones, who left the country during the 
conflict era.  Thus we assume $3.6 billion of national income for 1989 is increased by 10 
percent in 1990 and another 10 percent in 1991.  As confidence in stability begins to build, 
more refugees return and reconstruction gains momentum.  It rises by 25 percent in 1992.  
The successful elections in that year then encourages three consecutive 20 percent 
increases in 1993, 1994 and 1995, helped both by larger foreign assistance packages and 
the better performance of the Afghan economy.  From 1996 to 2003, the national income 
grew by a steady 5 percent annual increase, as the economy becomes fully functional.  
 
In the absence of reliable statistics on the government and the armed opposition spending 
during the period 1988 to 2003, it is assumed that the government and the anti-government 
forces spent at least $1 billion annually on defence: i.e. at least one-third of national income.  
By comparison, the estimated annual military expenditure of the Afghan government alone in 
2002 was $525.2 million, despite its heavy reliance on the US-led coalition force for its 
security.34  We assume that military expenditure could have fallen somewhat in the latter 
years of the peace scenario, consequent upon consolidation of rival factions.  
                                                 
31  World Bank, Afghanistan at a Glance, 9 September 2003. 
32  Ibid. 
33  Government of Canada. 
34  "Afghanistan: Military," AllRefer.com, 2004, accessed: 25 January 2004. 
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Table 1: Annual loss of national income as result of conflict ($bn 2004 prices) 
 
Year National income 
in Peace Scenario
National 
income in 
Conflict 
Scenario 
Loss of 
national 
income in 
Conflict 
Scenario 
Savings in 
military 
expenditure 
1989 3.6 3.3 0.3  
1990 3.9 3.3 0.6  
1991 4.4 3.3 1.1  
1992 5.5 3.3 2.2  
1993 6.6 3.3 3.3  
1994 7.9 3.4 4.5  
1995 9.5 3.5 6.0 0.1 
1996 10.0 3.6 6.4 0.1 
1997 10.5 3.7 6.8 0.2 
1998 11.0 3.8 7.2 0.2 
1999 11.6 3.9 7.7 0.2 
2000 12.2 4.0 8.2 0.2 
2001 12.8 4.0 8.8 0.3 
2002 13.4 5.2 8.2 0.3 
2003 14.1 6.8 7.3 0.3 
     
Total   78.6 1.9 
 
 
Additional costs to the neighbouring countries 
 
We have not assumed any losses of aggregate national income for Iran and Pakistan as a 
result of the conflict in Afghanistan in the 1990's.  However both countries faced losses in 
other forms, including significant spending on Afghan Mujahedin groups, on dealing with the 
Afghan-based international drug-trafficking in the case of Iran, and on hosting millions of 
Afghan refugees whose number fluctuated between 4 and 5 million during the period 1989-
2003.  The latter is used as the main cost of the conflict in Afghanistan for the two main 
neighbouring states.  
 
Regarding Afghan refugees, there were differences between the two host countries.  Iran 
used refugee camps close to its borders with Afghanistan mainly as a transit place for 
refugees entering that country, the overwhelming majority of whom were allowed to live in 
the Iranian cities after undergoing medical examinations and being issued ID cards.  They 
could then use publicly available services, e.g., education and health care, while being 
permitted to work.  The majority of them were employed.  Iran received insignificant amounts 
of funds from international organisations to help deal with 2-3 million Afghan refugees in its 
territory because of its international isolation.  It therefore had to fund almost the entire cost.  
Since Iran had a large and growing population the high rate of unemployment worsened after 
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the end of the Iran-Iraq war in 1988 when about 3 million military personnel were demobilised, 
the inflow of a few million Afghan refugees had a mainly negative impact on the Iranian 
economy.  However, to the extent that a large and growing refugee population may have 
contributed to the economy, it is assumed that their presence also had some positive effect.  
By contrast, in the case of Pakistan, the overwhelming majority of Afghan refugees were kept 
in camps, most of which were set up and funded by international organisations and NGOs.  
The Pakistan government received the bulk of the internationally provided funds for Afghan 
refugees in the 1980s, 1990s and the early 2000s and it is assumed that its costs were 
largely funded by the international community.  
 
Official statistics regarding Iranian government spending on the Afghan refugees are 
unavailable.  Many such costs, including education and medical services, were included in 
Iran's overall budget for those services.  In addition, most of the refugees entering Iran and 
Pakistan suffered from various diseases due to the lack of regular and universal vaccinations 
and clean water in Afghanistan.  Some of these diseases had virtually disappeared from Iran 
many years before the Afghan refugees began to arrive.  Their reintroduction in its border 
provinces through which the Afghan refugees entered Iran cost the Tehran government a 
good deal.  One should also add the cost of treating war-related wounded refugees.  We 
therefore assume an average annual cost to Iran of $1000 per refugee.35  Given an average 
refugee population of between 2m and 3m, the annual cost is estimated to be $2.5 billion. 
 
Table 2: Annual cost for Iran and Pakistan of housing refugees as result of conflict 
 
Year Cost of housing refugees 
(US$bn 2004 prices) 
1989 2.5 
1990 2.5 
1991 2.5 
1992 2.5 
1993 2.5 
1994 2.5 
1995 2.5 
1996 2.5 
1997 2.5 
1998 2.5 
1999 2.5 
2000 2.5 
2001 2.5 
2002 2.5 
2003 2.5 
Total 37.5 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
35  The 2001 United Nations appeal for funding to help an expected new wave of 2.5 million Afghan refugees requested "more 
than $500 million" for the period October to December 2001. Given that Afghan refugees in Iran involved other costs, 
including medical services, schooling and housing, a cost to Iran of $1000 per person is not unreasonable. 
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Additional direct costs to the wider international community in providing emergency 
assistance and in coping with other costs from the conflict 
 
For most of the period, costs to the international community from the conflict in Afghanistan 
were relatively modest, reflecting the lack of international engagement with the country.  
 
Estimates for 1989-2000 are based on available statistics on OECD countries' ODA to 
Afghanistan. 36   In addition, we include UNHCR costs of supporting around 2.5 million 
refugees in Pakistan estimated at $50 million per annum.   
 
During 2002, the international community spent $700m on humanitarian and relief efforts in 
Afghanistan and its neighbours, including supporting refugee return.  It was less successful 
in meeting its other commitments.  In addition, $420mn was spent on reconstruction and 
$200mn for direct budget support to the Government.37  The pace of spending continued to 
be restricted by the poor security situation. 
 
We also attribute some of the additional costs to the IC of international terrorism and the 
narcotics trade to the conflict in Afghanistan, given the latter’s role as a safe haven for Al 
Qaeda through the 1990s and its dominance of global opium production.  With regard to 
international terrorism, a series of incidents during the 1990s were directly related to Al 
Qa’eda, beginning with the failed attack on the World Trade Centre in 1993, the attacks on 
US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 and the crippling of USS Cole in 2000.  As UK 
Foreign Secretary Jack Straw recently argued: 
 
‘What the international community should have done is to heed the earlier warnings 
about the nature of Al-Qa’eda and to have taken earlier action to deal with Al-Qa’eda 
and the failing state which was harbouring it, which was Afghanistan.  Had we done 
that, we might have avoided September 11 and everything that followed.’38
 
The direct costs of the destruction in New York on September 11 2001 amounted to around 
$40 billion.39  These events might still have taken place in the absence of the protracted 
Afghan wars of the 1990s.  However, it is reasonable to suggest that the availability of 
Afghanistan as a centre for recruitment and training of large numbers of terrorist operatives, 
as well as a safe haven for Al Qa’eda leaders and associates involved in planning 
international terrorism, may have made the organisation of the events of 9/11 easier than it 
might otherwise have been.  Certainly, this is an assumption that most governments have 
now accepted and which was the main basis upon which the subsequent intervention in 
Afghanistan has been justified.  On the other hand, given that the socio-political and 
ideological causes of 9/11 were not primarily a result of events in Afghanistan, it would be 
simplistic to rule out the possibility of 9/11 even after a stable Afghan peace.  On balance, 
therefore, we assume that the risk of 9/11 would have been reduced by 50% in the event of 
successful CP in Afghanistan.  We can therefore estimate the additional direct costs to the 
US as being $20 billion spread evenly between 2001, 2002 and 2003.  
 
                                                 
36  OECD and World Bank, ‘Aid Charts for Recipient Countries and Territories – Afghanistan’, OECD, 2003. Many estimates of 
assistance allocated since 2001 do not make a distinction between military and non-military components, between pledged 
amounts and actual transfers, and between amounts spent on projects in Afghanistan and those allocated to include the 
operational cost of aid delivering agencies, NGOs, UN, and the EU in Afghanistan, including the hefty salaries of their 
foreign employees. Unless otherwise stated, figures apply to all mentioned amounts. 
37  World Bank, Afghanistan Transitional Support Strategy, March 2003, p. 6; Barnett Rubin and Humayun Hamidzada, 
Afghanistan Reconstruction, Center for International Cooperation, 2003. 
38 ‘ We should have hit al-Qa’eda sooner’, Daily Telegraph, 20 March 2004.  
39  Robert Looney, Strategic Insights, Volume I, Issue 6 (August 2002). 
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In addition, a number of recent studies have estimated the global cost of countering 
international terrorism (including inefficiencies in trade, security costs) at around 0.3% of 
global GDP, equivalent to $90 billion per year.40   
 
We do not include other wider economic costs incurred as a result of September 11, though 
it would be possible to do so.  In the event of the peace scenario in Afghanistan, we assume 
these costs could have been reduced by 20% during the period 1995-2003: a saving of $18 
billion per year by the end of this period.  The saving is less in earlier years, reflecting the 
lower levels of security precautions at that time.  The sensitivity analysis at the end of this 
paper will explore the implications of varying this assumption.  
 
From small beginnings, opium poppy production in Afghanistan grew fast during the wars of 
1980-2000.41  By the mid 1990s, it dominated the supply to world markets, accounting for 
three quarters of heroin reaching Western Europe.  In the peace scenario, we assume that 
this level of production decreases significantly as Government control of its territory expands 
and alternative economic opportunities are created.  If this reduction in supply had resulted in 
a significant reduction in total availability in global markets, the benefits would have been 
considerable.  In neighbouring Iran, Pakistan and Central Asia, as well as further afield in 
Afghanistan, Europe and the US, increased consumption of heroin and other narcotics 
played a key role in both large-scale organised crime and small-scale criminality.  In the UK 
(90% of whose heroin originates in opium from Afghanistan), drug use has been a key factor 
in the rapid growth in prison population over the last decade.  Reducing global access to 
heroin might, therefore, have had significant social and economic benefits.  The causal 
relationships are too complex and under-explored to discuss in this paper.  For the purposes 
of our calculation, however, we assume that the total global costs of narcotic misuse are at 
least $200 billion and that these costs would have been reduced by 5% if supply from 
Afghanistan were to be reduced to a fraction of its current level without full transfer of 
production elsewhere.42  These savings, it is assumed, would be progressively realised from 
1992 onwards in the peace scenario for Afghanistan.  
                                                 
40  The IMF estimated that the loss of US output resulting from terrorism related costs could be as high as 0.75% of US GDP. 
A 2002 CBO study estimated terrorism directly cost the US about 0.3% of non-farm GDP, and reduced total factor 
productivity by around 0.3%. Robert Keleher, ‘The Economic Costs of Terrorism’, Joint Economic Committee, US 
Congress, May 2002, and Geoff Raby, DFAT Australia, ‘The Costs of Terrorism and the benefits of cooperating to combat 
terrorism’, 24 February 2003 provide useful surveys of the literature, including these results.  
41  Draft Technical Annex 2 to Chapter 1 of World Bank et al , Securing Afghanistan’s Future, 2004.  
42  This estimate takes into account drug control budgets ($33 billion in the US alone), cocaine and heroin consumer spending 
($80  billion in the US and Europe), as well as spending on prisons, crime, personal security. 
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Table 3: Costs to international community in providing emergency assistance and coping 
with other costs of conflict ($m 2004 prices) 
 
Year Assistance to 
Afghanistan and 
neighbours 
Cost of 11th Sept 
(reduced by 
50%) 
Counter-
terrorism 
costs 
Costs of 
narcotics 
misuse 
1989 150    
1990 180    
1991 180    
1992 190   1000 
1993 180   2000 
1994 200   3000 
1995 160  9000 4000 
1996 352  9000 5000 
1997 457  9000 6000 
1998 364  9000 7000 
1999 174  10000 8000 
2000 237  12000 9000 
2001 550 6000 18000 10000 
2002 1300 7000 18000 10000 
2003 2000 7000 18000 10000 
Total 6674 20bn 112bn 75bn 
 
 
Additional direct costs to the wider international community in stopping the conflict 
after it has started 
 
In October 2001 the US, with support from allies, intervened in Afghanistan to end its civil 
war and destroy the Afghan-based activities of Al-Qaeda.  The estimated cost of military 
operations in Afghanistan for the US peaked at $1.5 billion a month at the height of the 
operations in late 2001, before falling to around $1 billion per month thereafter.43  This high 
level of costs for a relatively small number of military personnel (only 9,000) reflects several 
factors, including high logistical costs (e.g. for helicopter transportation) as a result of poor 
infrastructure, harsh geography and intensive operations, as well as the need for 35,000 
support troops based outside the country.44   To the total, one should add the cost of 
sustaining military personnel from other allies, including the UK ($700mn in 2002/03) and 
other contributors to ISAF and, most recently, provincial reconstruction teams.  
 
Here we assume the total operational cost met by these allies is $1.5 billion in the first year, 
reflecting (in particular) significant UK involvement in the war-fighting and immediate 
stabilisation phases and then a decline to $0.75 billion a year for the 5,000 strong ISAF 
force.45
 
 
                                                 
43  Letter to Pete Domenici, Congressional Budget Office, 10 April 2002; IISS, Military Balance 2002--2003, October 1992, p. 
243; Bradley Graham, ‘Disparity in Iraq, Afghanistan War Costs Scrutinised’, Washington Post, 11 November, 2003. 
44  Bradley Graham, ibid.  
45  Per soldier cost for US forces in Afghanistan and Iraq respectively are $270,000 and $240,000. Ibid. This compares with 
$125,000 per soldier for UK forces in Iraq in 2003/04. Calculated from UK MoD, Operations in Iraq: Lessons for the Future, 
December 2003, Chapter 12. Given the leaner cost profile of European forces, more comparable to the UK than the US, 
we assume a $150,000 per soldier cost. 
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Table 4: Costs for international community in stopping conflict ($bn 2004 prices) 
 
Year US military operations  
in Afghanistan 
Other countries / ISAF 
1989 0 0 
1990 0 0 
1991 0 0 
1992 0 0 
1993 0 0 
1994 0 0 
1995 0 0 
1996 0 0 
1997 0 0 
1998 0 0 
1999 0 0 
2000 0 0 
2001 4 0 
2002 12 1.5 
2003 12 0.75 
Total 28 2.25 
 
 
 
2.5 PROBABILITY OF THE CONFLICT WITHOUT CONFLICT PREVENTION  
 PACKAGES 
 
By definition, the probability of conflict in the absence of a conflict prevention package is 100 
percent. 
 
 
2.6 CONFLICT PREVENTION PACKAGES 
 
The following two CP packages are highly hypothetical as it is difficult even in retrospect to 
determine what would have been needed to prevent the re-emergence of conflict in 
Afghanistan after 1989.  
 
The main objective of both packages is to support the hypothetical ceasefire in 1989 and to 
underpin the strengthening of the subsequent peace process, as described in the above-
mentioned peace scenario.  At the heart of both packages, therefore, is the assumption that 
the situation in 1989 was ‘ripe’ for a peace settlement, with the withdrawal of Soviet troops 
providing an opportunity for the international community to help the opposing Afghan parties 
achieve a durable peace.  Having backed the Mujahedin groups for about a decade, the 
Western countries, along with Iran and Pakistan, pressure their respective protégés to 
respect the ceasefire and to initiate negotiations with the Kabul regime.  The Western 
countries use the promise of a substantial aid package for the devastated country, including 
the areas under the control of different factional leaders, to support the resumption of 
negotiations and a subsequent peace settlement.  
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Although the depth of conflict-related destruction in Afghanistan may have been somewhat 
less in 1989 than in 2002, the main points of reference for calculation of the levels of financial 
assistance required in both packages are, respectively, those that were actually delivered 
and expected in the early phases of the 2002 intervention and the subsequent 2004 
reconstruction needs assessment conducted in 2004.46  The main point of reference for 
military support to the peace process in 1989 onwards (relevant only to Package 2) is also 
based on 2001-2004 experience.  
 
Conflict Prevention Package 1 
 
This package focuses on providing financial assistance at a level roughly comparable to 
current international efforts, designed to demonstrate to the warring parties in the early 
1990s the benefits that can be achieved through development and peace.  It includes 
significant direct recurrent budget support for the new government in recreating national 
services, including police and military forces.  It also includes funding for demining, 
demobilisation and significant development expenditure.  Total annual assistance is set at 
$300mn in 1990, rising steadily until the mid-1990s to a substantial $1.3bn per annum (in line 
with amounts actually disbursed during 2001-2004), then falling slowly thereafter as domestic 
revenue sources begin to develop.  It therefore assumes per capita aid levels of around $50 
per head for most of the period: roughly comparable to current levels of reconstruction 
spending in Afghanistan, but does not allow for the significantly increased levels of 
assistance proposed in the WB’s 2002 and 2004 needs assessments.47  In order to take into 
account the one-off costs involved in meeting the immediate humanitarian crisis, including 
refugee return, the contribution for 1990 is increased by $700 million, the level of such 
spending in 2002.  It is not assumed that any significant additional commitment is possible 
(compared with what actually happened) in 1989.  
 
Although it includes technical and financial assistance to the security sector, this package 
does not include any direct military commitment (in the form of either a war-fighting or an 
ISAF-style force).  This is to allow for the possibility that an ODA-only package for 
Afghanistan in 1989-91 might be seen as more plausible than one involving the substantial 
deployment of NATO forces in Afghanistan in the immediate aftermath of Soviet withdrawal 
in 1989, and at a time when large US and UK forces were also deploying (in the latter half of 
1990) for war in Kuwait.  
 
                                                 
46  World Bank et al, Securing Afghanistan’s Future: Accomplishments and the Strategic Path Forward, ADB / World Bank / 
UNDP / UNAMA, 17 March, 2004. See also World Bank, Afghanistan Preliminary Needs Assessment for Recovery and 
Reconstruction, World Bank, January 2002. 
47  Ibid. 
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Table 5: Cost of conflict prevention package 1 ($bn, 2004 prices) 
 
Year Cost of package 
1989 0 
1990 1.0 
1991 1.0 
1992 1.3 
1993 1.3 
1994 1.3 
1995 1.3 
1996 1.2 
1997 1.2 
1998 1.0 
1999 1.0 
2000 1.0 
2001 0.8 
2002 0.8 
2003 0.8 
Total 15 
 
 
Conflict Prevention Package 2 
 
This package is more ambitious than the first one and includes both a significant military 
deployment of external military forces and a large programme of economic assistance.  
Although such a package may not have been politically feasible in the international 
geopolitical circumstances of 1989-91, it is important (with the hindsight gained from 9/11) to 
consider whether such a package might have been an effective means of conflict prevention. 
 
First, the package includes a significant deployment of combat-capable troops, designed to 
deter and if necessary defeat potential ‘spoilers’ to the peace process, together with a 
substantial military force for lower-intensity peacekeeping and policing missions.  Their main 
roles are to ensure the compliance of both sides with their commitments under the peace 
accord and to provide security until new Afghan security forces are formed.  This makes the 
warring parties more likely to take the risks involved in peacemaking and disarmament and 
helps create the conditions for the implementation of ambitious development programmes.  
To ensure that Iran, Pakistan and Russia are on board, the UN-led military force includes a 
range of countries in its ranks.   
 
The annual cost of the current US and NATO forces in Afghanistan is $13bn.  The envisaged 
force for 1990 deployment is estimated to be larger in its ISAF-style peacekeeping/ 
reconstruction component, but smaller in its high-intensity element, which may reduce its 
cost somewhat.  Yet the initial cost will depend crucially on the extent to which some of the 
warring parties choose (as in 2002-4) to mount a sustained challenge to the peace 
settlement.  On the assumption that some such challenge would have been likely in 1990-92, 
we cautiously assume an initial cost similar to the current cost, which then declines sharply 
over time as war-fighting operations come to an end, and a combination of UN peacekeeping 
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and Afghan forces progressively takes over.  Initially, the total external force might include 
around 30,000 troops on the ground, along with 20,000 support troops based elsewhere.  
Although this level is progressively reduced, we assume that a UN force remains in place 
until 1998, by which time national Afghan security forces are fully able to take their place.  
 
Second, this CP Package involves a package of financial assistance that is markedly more 
generous than that envisaged in the first CP package. This is based on the detailed needs 
assessment by the Afghan Government and international organisations, published in 2004, 
and reflects the assumption that the provision of a safer security environment by an external 
UN force allows Afghanistan to absorb much higher levels of assistance than in the first 
Package.  It would have allowed the new Government to achieve significant progress in 
infrastructure building (roads, water, electricity, telecommunications and fuel networks), 
education and health services, security (police and military), demining, DDR, ending opium 
cultivation and investment in agriculture and industry.  Since it takes time to build up a 
programme of this magnitude, we assume spending levels rise from $2bn in 1990 to $4bn in 
1993, then stabilising before falling in the late 1990s when greater mobilisation of domestic 
revenue sources becomes possible.  As in CP1, we include $700m in 1990 for humanitarian 
assistance.  
 
By 1994, this level of assistance equates to around $160 per head, lower than the per capita 
level in immediately post-war Bosnia ($273 in 1996), but otherwise one of the highest in the 
world at that time.48  It would probably have made Afghanistan the world’s biggest ODA 
recipient: comparable with the 1994 receipts of China ($3.9bn), and dwarfing those of high-
population (and more politically stable) countries such as Egypt ($3.0bn), India ($2.6bn) and 
Bangladesh ($2.1bn).49  
                                                 
48  World Development Indicators; World Development Report 2004. 
49  World Development Indicators 1997, Table 6.10. Converted into 2004 prices. 
 38
Table 6: Cost of conflict prevention package 2 ($bn 2004 prices) 
 
Year Financial 
Assistance 
Military forces Total Cost 
1989 0 0 0 
1990 2 13 15 
1991 3 8 11 
1992 3 7 10 
1993 4 6 10 
1994 4 5 9 
1995 4 4 8 
1996 4 4 8 
1997 4 3 7 
1998 4 2 6 
1999 4 0 4 
2000 3 0 3 
2001 3 0 3 
2002 3 0 3 
2003 3 0 3 
Total 48 52 100 
 
 
2.7 PROBABILITY OF CONFLICT WITH CONFLICT PREVENTION PACKAGES 
 
Probability of Conflict with Conflict Prevention Package 1 
 
Given the devastation of the country, this package would have provided the opposing sides 
with a significant incentive to refrain from resorting to arms in the short term, not least 
because of the reluctance of foreign powers to fund a new round of hostility.  Small-scale 
operations, while likely, would not have escalated to a major conflict.  
 
In the medium-term, however, it is possible that the relatively small level of foreign 
assistance on offer would not have been enough to provide a sufficiently strong stake in 
peace for the parties to the conflict.  Depending on priorities within the available aid, it might 
have proven impossible to simultaneously fund full demobilisation of ex-fighters, basic 
infrastructural investment and significant improvements in provision of employment and 
education opportunities for ex-combatants.  Consequently, remaining loyal to their armed 
political groups, including the warlords, might have been the best option for many soldiers.  
The competing attractions of involvement in the Afghan-based international drug trade might 
have further undermined the viability of the aid package.  
 
Yet it is probably the absence of a credible security guarantee that would undermine this 
package most severely.  Neither side would have felt secure in agreeing to implement its 
ceasefire commitments, without an impartial force to oblige the other side to follow suit.  As a 
consequence, conflicts among the rival warlords and their affiliated political groups would 
have been likely to re-emerge.  Even if there were an initial period of peace as a result of a 
UN-brokered settlement, the absence of a significant UN military presence would have 
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increased the chances of major military conflicts emerging within 1-3 years of a ceasefire, as 
all sides sought to press home temporary military advantages before the creation of strong 
national armed forces could be consolidated.  Fear of such a shift in the balance of power in 
favour of a Mujahedin group/alliance with affiliations with Iran or Pakistan could in turn have 
provoked the other country to act to prevent such a scenario, increasing the chances of 
escalation to a new round of civil war in 1992 / 1993. 
 
The possibility that the Pashtun-dominated Kabul regime, deprived of its Soviet sponsor, 
might now ally with pro-Pakistani Pashtun groups could have been another trigger for large-
scale conflict.  In the absence of a realistic possibility for a significant change in Afghanistan's 
economic situation, the unstable political situation would have also provided grounds for 
intervention by neighbours.  Their probable incentives could have been to end the chaos to 
prevent its possible spill-over into their countries, to help their protégés establish a 
government or to end drug-trafficking.  
 
Although CP1 might well have delayed the return to civil war, therefore, we estimate that the 
probability of a return to large-scale armed conflict, on a scale comparable to that actually 
experienced in the 1990s, would have been very high during the period 1989-2003.  We 
estimate the probability of avoiding a return to large-scale conflict, as a result of CP1, as 
being only 20%. 
 
Probability of Conflict with Conflict Prevention Package 2 
 
This Package would have had a significantly greater chance of success in preventing large-
scale armed conflict in the medium and long term.  The combination of an unprecedently 
large economic assistance package and security guarantees backed by significant military 
deployments would have reduced the probability of civil war to relatively low levels.  Some 
risk would remain that internal spoilers (rebellious warlords and dissatisfied Afghans) and/or 
hostile neighbours (especially those opposed to the extension of US power in the region) 
might have sought to undermine a new settlement.  Their chances of success would have 
been considerably reduced, however, by the sheer scale of the economic and military 
commitment assumed here.  The heavy security presence would likely have been sufficient 
to allow for the reconstruction of a viable Afghan state and the high level of economic 
assistance could have further strengthened the chances of peace.  
 
Even so, the possibility of the re-emergence of conflict in later years cannot be ruled out, 
even in this scenario.  First, although the sizeable aid package envisaged would have 
benefited large sections of Afghan society, the distribution of these benefits would likely have 
been uneven, favouring urban areas compared with rural ones and some ethnic groups and 
regions over others.  Increased horizontal inequality of this sort might in turn have helped to 
increase the possibility that a relatively fragile government in Kabul would disintegrate on 
factional / ethnic lines.  Second, massive increases in aid flows, together with increased 
drug-related income, might have risked providing increased incentives for competition for 
control of national and local political power, as well as providing resources for financing 
armed groups that sought to take part in such a competition.  The mere assumption of 
increased levels of aid is not sufficient.  Without appropriately-structured (and ‘conflict-
sensitive’) aid, there is a real risk that aid could fuel conflict rather than dampen it.  Third, but 
not least, the gradual withdrawal of foreign military forces assumed in this Package might 
itself have been a cause of instability, as different factions manoeuvred to take advantage of 
a post-UN environment.  The unknown willingness of the contributing countries to the 
peacekeeping force to engage in a further major military conflict would have made such a 
conflict more likely.  Fourth, the package assumes that the international community, including 
Afghanistan’s neighbours, remains united in its support for the central Afghan government.  
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The greater the failure to curb the power of regional leaders, however, the greater the risk 
that this unity would have been fractured, opening up the possibility of external sponsorship 
of rival factions.  
 
Taking all these factors into account, we do not rule out the possibility of a relatively stable 
peace being achieved.  The chances of such a peace continuing would likely have grown if 
the central government could have consolidated its power in the early 1990s and if large-
scale economic reconstruction and development could have begun.  Even with a massive 
external commitment (much greater, for example, than that in the Balkans in the same 
period), the project of political consolidation could have failed as a result of some or all the 
factors outlined above.  On balance, therefore, we assess that the probability of civil war 
would still have been 40 percent over the whole period 1989-2003, with probably the greatest 
risk being in the mid 1990s.  
 
 
2.8 NET PRESENT VALUE AND ASSESSMENT 
 
Neither of the CP Packages under discussion in this paper were ever likely to happen and 
our calculations go some way to explaining why this was the case.  Both packages involve 
very high levels of investment, yet (in our assessment) might have delivered only partial 
reductions in the probability of conflict.  The main reason for the relatively high level of 
expense of CP in this case study is that Afghanistan had already experienced a decade of 
civil war, had been heavily armed (on both sides) by foreign powers and was facing 
considerable obstacles to a negotiated peace, not least because of this preceding conflict.  
 
Almost all (99%) of the costs of the Afghan conflict to the IC relate either to its estimated 
deleterious effects on international terrorism and the global narcotics trade, or to the costs of 
the September 11th attacks on the US, and the subsequent US-led intervention in 
Afghanistan.  The retrospective case for the cost-effectiveness of CP in Afghanistan, 
therefore, rests on the assumption that Afghanistan’s war had a significant effect on the scale 
of international terrorism and/or the global drugs problem.  If such a relationship did exist, 
making even modest inroads into the costs of these global problems would have made CP 
worthwhile.  In this study, we have assumed that the creation of a peaceful and stable 
Afghanistan in the 1990s would have reduced the probability of 9/11 by 50%, reduced the 
total costs of dealing with international terrorism by 20% and reduced the total costs incurred 
as a result of the international drugs trade by 5%.  On these assumptions, both CP Packages 
would have been worthwhile to the IC at relatively low breakeven probabilities of success 
(7% and 50% respectively).  
 
If these costs are excluded, the retrospective cost-effectiveness of CP in Afghanistan to the 
IC is very low indeed.  On this assumption, Afghanistan would be the exception that proves 
the rule about CP being cheaper than cure. 
 
Alternatively, if the indirect costs to the IC are excluded, but account is taken of the high 
costs of conflict to Afghanistan and its neighbours, the first CP Package generates a modest 
positive return, but the second does not.  In the latter case, the sheer scale of the projected 
CP Package (involving an initial deployment of 30,000 troops, and the provision of a level of 
ODA larger in absolute terms than that provided to any other aid recipient) means that its 
projected costs would have exceeded the combined benefits to the IC, directly affected 
territory and neighbours.  
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3.1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
In this paper we discuss the possibilities for prevention of the Rwandan conflicts of the early 
1990s, their costs and the costs of conflict that might have been saved.  The events taken 
into account are strictly related to Rwanda’s civil war, which broke out in 1990 and the 
genocide in 1994.  They include, besides the war and the genocide, the refugee crisis and 
the first Congo war (1996-1997).  The purpose of the latter was to free the refugees from the 
grip of the genocidal former government and to guarantee the security of Rwanda’s borders 
from former extremist fighters.  It was therefore a direct consequence of the previous 
Rwanda conflict.  By contrast, we do not take into account the cost of later phases of the 
Congo war, since their causal relationship with the Rwandan war and genocide is much more 
questionable.  
 
This study focuses on two windows of opportunity for outside intervention during 1989-2003.  
The most realistic options were chosen, even though other preventive measures could have 
been taken further in the past.  The first possibility for outside intervention (Conflict 
Prevention Package 1) would have been in 1990-1991 when the civil war was still in a very 
early and limited stage.  An early international engagement in the form of support for peace 
negotiations, together with a commitment to a peacekeeping force to oversee the 
implementation of any agreement, would have increased the chances that the outcome of 
such agreement would have been implemented.  This Package also involves economic 
support.  Due to the deep economic crisis it had experienced since the late 1980s, Rwanda 
in 1990 had gone through a period of considerable economic and political instability.  A 
significant reallocation of aid budgets during this period could have softened the impact of 
the structural adjustment programme and its related costs.  It could also have built in 
disincentives for the radicalising government, which in reality was spending much of its 
income on the war effort.  This combined package would not have fully solved Rwanda’s 
instability, but it had a 50% chance of stopping the war before it escalated and caused 
significant damage.  More importantly, if the civil war had not happened, the much greater 
costs of the genocide would also have been avoided.  
 
A second opportunity was missed in 1994.  While the international community had known 
since 1993 that large scale violence was to be expected in Rwanda, it undertook little action.  
Knowing that the genocide consisted of two phases (physical elimination of opposition in 
Kigali and countrywide ethnic killings afterwards) and was carefully planned by a small group 
of people, a relatively limited military intervention (Conflict Prevention Package 2) would have 
been sufficient to stop the killings in Kigali and thus prevent the spread of the genocide to the 
rest of the country.  Such an intervention would not have solved the root causes of the 
instability, and further monitoring of the situation for a few more years would have been 
necessary in order to support a return to stability.  Nevertheless, the chance that the 
genocide would have occurred with this package is estimated at only 1%.  It would not only 
have saved massive costs, but also hundreds of thousands of lives.  
 
We conclude that both CP packages studied would have had to reduce the probability of 
conflict by around 15% in order to be cost-effective for the IC.  If the costs to Rwanda itself 
are also taken into account, the breakeven probability would have been much lower, at 
around 3%.  In both calculations, therefore, conflict prevention statistically stood a very good 
chance of saving money. 
 
If one were to try to make a choice between the two packages under study many other 
factors would need to be taken into account.  Package 1 which essentially argues for early 
international engagement at the very onset of conflict (in contrast to Package 2 which 
supposes robust military intervention when conflict threatens to escalate to unacceptably 
high levels) seems to be the obvious choice, in terms of cost effectiveness, the expectation 
of an overall higher success rate, and (last but not least) the human costs of the civil war. 
However, we equally have to realise that in 1990 no-one would have expected the initial RPF 
incursion into Rwanda to have the wider ramifications it eventually did.  No-one could have 
predicted the genocide at that point, let alone the refugee saga and the first Congo war.  
Moreover, since in 1990-91 it would have been difficult to predict the further evolvement of 
the actual conflict scenario, it would have been more difficult for external actors to get a grip 
on the situation.  As a result, we estimate that there would still have remained a 50% chance 
of the civil war happening despite the implementation of the suggested CP package.  These 
handicaps have to be taken into account when evaluating it. 
 
CP Package 2 is a more straightforward package since the conflict had evolved to the extent 
that it became more predictable that decisive action at the right moment stood a very high 
chance of stopping the genocide and all its related costs.  However, this would imply that 
Rwanda had already suffered from the war for several years.  While the economic costs of 
the war are low, the social and political cost of the war on Rwanda’s future stability should 
not be underestimated, even though they have not been taken into account here.  
Reconciliation would be harder than in the case of Package 1 and so would the formation of 
a coalition government acceptable to all.  It can be argued that a Rwandan government 
formed after implementation of Package 2 would have had the added bonus of the RPF 
weighing more heavily on the macro-economic management of Rwanda and having a 
positive effect on trying to solve some of Rwanda’s structural economic problems, which had 
remained unaddressed until then.  However, once again, we should not only look at 
economic indicators.  The RPF is an elite minority that dominates policy and has a poor 
human rights record both within Rwanda and in neighbouring Congo.  Hence, in terms of 
national and regional political stability, it might have been better to have had a Rwandan 
government resulting from an implementation of Package 1 which would have given the RPF 
a much smaller share in power (because it would not have had the time to prove itself on the 
battle field).  Such a coalition would have been more acceptable to the Rwandan political 
establishment of the time and could therefore have prevented the radicalisation within circles 
of the Rwandan political elite. 
 
The conclusions reached here are not substantially influenced by varying the costs of the 
Packages.  Even if the economic support costs included in Package 1 are doubled, it would 
still have been cost-effective to the IC at a breakeven probability of success of 24%.  
Similarly, a trebling of the costs of the military force included in Package 2 would have 
increased the breakeven probability of cost-effectiveness to the IC to 46%: still well below the 
near-certainty of success which the study suggests would have been achieved with a smaller 
force.  In both cases, the breakeven probability is much lower once the costs of the conflict 
and genocide to the Rwandan people is taken into account.  
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3.2 INTRODUCTION 
 
In this paper, we discuss the possibilities for external intervention in the Rwandan conflict, 
their related costs and the costs of conflict that might have been saved.   In order to do this, 
first of all we need a clear understanding of what is meant by the Rwandan conflict.  The 
Great Lakes Region of East-Central Africa has witnessed many violent conflicts over the past 
fifteen years, including the civil war in Rwanda (1990-1994), the Rwandan genocide in 1994, 
the war in Northern Uganda, the Burundi conflict and the two Congo wars (1996-1997 and 
the second war starting in 1998).  The civil war that started in Rwanda in October 1990 and 
the genocide that occurred from April 1994 are generally understood as events that have 
negatively affected the stability of the whole Great Lakes Region.  Indeed, since the outbreak 
of the Rwandan conflict, the situation in Burundi has further deteriorated, the conflict in 
Northern Uganda has exploded and the Democratic Republic of the Congo has experienced 
two wars.  
 
Despite the fact that the genocide in Rwanda is generally seen as the trigger for much of the 
instability in the region, the linkages between these different conflicts are not always 
straightforward.  It is thus unjustified for the purpose of this study to study all these events as 
part of one conflict.  Instead, we limit ourselves to the civil war (1990-1994), the genocide 
(1994) and its immediate aftermath, and the first Congo war (1996-1997).  Much of the 
violence witnessed thereafter in this region can not be directly related back to these events.  
 
We will discuss the possibility of intervention in Rwanda at two specific points.  There would 
have been other, including earlier, interventions possible than the ones discussed here.  
However, we have chosen the most realistic options within the historical time frame given.  
First of all, there was the option of an early intervention in 1990 when the civil war was still in 
a very early stage with limited negative effects.  The possible outcomes and cost of an early 
international diplomatic engagement to prevent escalation will be calculated.  As part of the 
same prevention package, the economic policies towards Rwanda are altered, as there is 
ground to argue that these increased the levels of destabilisation and violence that took 
place in 1992 – 1993.  
 
A second possible intervention would have been in the weeks and even days running up to 
the start of the genocide in Kigali in April 1994.  It is now commonly accepted that, if 
UNAMIR had been given the mandate and manpower to intervene, the massacres could 
have been contained in Kigali instead of turning into a country wide genocide, with massive 
loss of life, huge numbers of refugees and a near totally destroyed territory. 
 
 
3.3 PEACE AND CONFLICT SCENARIOS 
 
Conflict Scenario 
 
In October 1990, the RPF (Rwandan Patriotic Front) invaded Rwanda from Uganda.  The 
RPF consisted of Rwandan Tutsi who had lived in exile in Uganda since the 1960s and had 
fought alongside Museveni in the National Resistance Army.  The Rwandan army was taken 
by surprise and only managed to deflect the RPF attack with the help of French and Zairean 
elite troops.  However, from 1991 both sides started to re-arm and increase their troops 
dramatically so that subsequent military confrontations increasingly resulted in larger 
displacement and physical destruction.  A Peace Accord (the ‘Arusha Accord’) was brokered 
with the help of Tanzania and the OAU in 1993 and included the deployment of a UN 
peacekeeping force (UNAMIR).  By this stage, however, sections within the Rwandan 
government had radicalised so much that they now found the peace agreement 
unacceptable.  Even though Arusha was a technically sophisticated process, its timing was 
too late.  
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This had to do mainly with the fact that the RPF had secured itself an important share in the 
proposed transition government and army on the basis of its military success.  A range of 
other factors also had a destabilising effect on Rwanda during this period.  Since the late 
1980s Rwanda had entered a deep economic crisis due to drastically shrinking export 
revenues, which in turn had forced it to accept a Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) in 
1990.  There is much controversy about the actual impact of the SAP, which was never fully 
implemented.  Nevertheless, it is clear that worsening economic conditions led to general 
discontent, thereby contributing to the radicalisation of society.  Ethnic militia and gangs 
found it easier to recruit youth who had fewer alternative opportunities open to them.  The 
pressure to ‘democratise’ in the middle of a war further increased political tensions.  These 
combined factors created a fertile breeding ground for ethnic scape-goating and popular 
discontent in general. 
 
As a last resort to avoid the implementation of the Arusha Accord, an extremist circle within 
the Rwandan government started in April 1994 the elimination of all potential opposition.  The 
genocide was initially a well planned execution of political opposition and only weeks later 
turned into countrywide killings with an ethnic character.  While a combination of many 
contextual factors can explain the militarisation of Rwandan society and the rise of extremist 
groups in the period leading up to the genocide, it is of crucial importance to distinguish 
between ethnic violence and genocide.  The difference between both is not just a question of 
scale.  The genocide was not a popular outburst of discontent but was imagined, organised 
and set in motion by a well defined group of actors.  Its prevention therefore was, as will be 
argued, relatively straightforward. 
 
In response to the genocide, the RPF broke the cease fire and resumed the civil war, 
achieving a rapid military victory and coming to power in July 1994.  The extremist interim 
government fled south and eventually into Zaire, taking about 2 million Rwandans with it on 
its flight, confronting the humanitarian community with one of the biggest refugee crises and 
humanitarian emergencies ever.  During this period of exile, the former government and 
army planned a re-invasion of Rwanda and, for this purpose, organised military training, 
incursions into Rwanda (killing local officials and genocide survivors) and purchased military 
equipment.  In mid 1996, the new RPF dominated government in Kigali intervened and 
‘closed down’ the camps, forcing the majority of refugees to return home.  At the same time, 
Rwanda and Uganda started a war to dispose of Mobutu as leader of Zaire in the hope of 
installing a new regime that would guarantee the security of its borders.  This war came to an 
end when Kabila became Zaire’s, now the Democratic Republic of Congo, new President in 
March 1997. 
 
Peace Scenarios 
 
Within the Rwandan conflict, we identify two separate peace scenarios, related to the timing 
of the two CP packages.  In the first scenario, the civil war is stopped in its tracks shortly 
after it starts in October 1990, i.e. before significant destruction and killing has taken place.  
In fact labelling the incursion at that stage a true civil war is a bit of an overstatement.  This 
peace scenario therefore means the continuation of political tension, but without actual 
military confrontation, violence and its related costs.  The avoidance of civil war in this 
scenario, it is assumed, would also have prevented the genocide four years later, although it 
was difficult to foresee at the time.  This hypothetical peace scenario would be one where an 
early Arusha Peace Accord, in some version, was successfully implemented.  As pointed out 
in the conflict scenario, Arusha was a good process but it came too late.  An early peace 
agreement would have meant a smaller share in power for the RPF, which would have been 
more acceptable to the Rwandan political establishment.  Since Rwanda was already going 
through a multi-faceted crisis as described above, these tensions would most likely remain 
unresolved and thus a risk of some renewed violence remains not unlikely. However, this 
peace scenario assumes that this does not take the form of large-scale armed violence 
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during the period until 2003.  For the purposes of this assessment, we assume that the 
development policies subsequently adopted by a coalition government would have been 
similar to those of the RPF-dominated government that eventually came to power (though 
see comments below on human development).  
 
The second peace scenario involves the avoidance of the genocide, but not the preceding 
civil war.  This would have meant a prevention of escalation into massive scale killing, 
destruction and human displacement.  However the root causes of the previously existing 
instability would not have been addressed and thus ‘peace’ in this case would have meant 
the return to a period of instability and most likely some low intensity conflict in the immediate 
aftermath of the prevented genocide.  In this scenario, we also assume that Arusha would 
eventually be implemented and that the economic crisis gets addressed.  So we can 
eventually expect to see a slow but gradual return to stability. 
 
This case study is confined to those events that can be considered as direct results of the 
Rwanda conflict, i.e. the civil war and the genocide.  The prevention of the Rwandan civil war 
and/or the genocide would have had a very uncertain effect, for example, on the future 
direction of the conflict in Burundi.  As for the second Congo war, it is our assessment that 
Rwanda and Uganda invaded Congo mainly for economic reasons and that the question of 
security was only of relative importance.  In other words, the second Congo war might have 
happened regardless of previous events in Rwanda and the costs and benefits which were 
incurred by it can therefore hardly be seen as a result of the Rwandan conflict.  In comparing 
the costs of the peace and conflict scenarios in this case study, therefore, we do not include 
an assessment of either the massive costs of the second Congo war to Congo or the 
significant economic gains made by Rwanda.  
 
 
3.4 ADDITIONAL ANNUAL COSTS OF THE CONFLICT SCENARIO 
 
In this section, we will describe the actual costs of the conflict as it happened and as it is 
described above.  As a baseline for comparison we take the year 1989 to calculate costs 
incurred.  Since the Rwanda conflict consists of two main events, the civil war and the 
genocide, and the suggested CP packages are each destined at one of those events, the 
discussion of the costs is split between these two periods. 
 
Additional costs to the directly-affected territory 
 
The civil war in 1990 and 1991 was rather limited in scale.  This is reflected in the estimated 
costs.  The RPF attack displaced about 65,000 people in the Northern part of Rwanda and 
the war affected a comparatively small part of the territory.  Yet from 1991 both sides started 
to expand their fighting force dramatically and invest heavily in arms, so that a second RPF 
offensive in 1991 resulted in a bigger military confrontation, eventually with more pronounced 
negative results.50
 
                                                 
50  The Government of Rwanda estimated the cost of reconstructing the war ravaged North at $20m in 1992. This included 
damages to forestry resources, the Akagera National Par, general infrastructure and housing of 65 000 IDPs. Cf. 
Republique du Rwanda, October 1991, Reconstruction des zones endommagées et la réinstallation des populations 
déplacés, Kigali. Since the number of IDPs had increased more than tenfold in 1993, it is not unreasonable to multiply the 
damages by at least five, especially with regard to socio-economic damage  
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Table 1: Environmental, infrastructural and socio-economic damage in $m 
 
 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Current prices 20 20 100 1 000 
2004 prices 26 25 122 1 193 
 
 
The direct damages of the genocide are vast and difficult to quantify, especially since the 
most important cost is human (700,000 killed and 2 million refugees).  Material damage 
includes destruction of public buildings and private homes, fields and harvests, bridges and 
other infrastructure.  The estimated total cost of $1 billion for 1994 is based on the budgets 
that the Rwandan government requested for post-war reconstruction and funds that were 
pledged at the 1995 Round Table for Donors for the Reconstruction of Rwanda.  This 
includes damage to the social sector (health and education), estimated in the order of $200m, 
damage to public buildings in urban centres alone at $250m and destruction of houses in 
general another $200m.51  The extremist Rwandan government also took an estimated $60m 
(cash, vehicles etc.) with it on its flight to Zaire.52  1995 and 1996 saw no addition to this cost, 
since all destruction took place in 1994.  Under ‘other costs’ in table 6 below we include costs 
related to the demobilisation of the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA), to the genocide survivor 
fund (which was 5% of Rwanda’s annual budget) and the huge cost of the gacaca popular 
genocide tribunals which was another 3% of the budget since 2003.  Most of these costs 
have been carried by the Rwandan government. 
 
Table 2: Increase in military expenditure in $m53
 
 1990 1991 1992 1993 
Government +43.7 +73.1 +54.3 +51.4 
Rebels +25 +25 +50 +50 
Total 68 98 104 101 
Total 2004 prices 90 125 130 123 
 
 
Military expenditure by both sides increased the cost of conflict very noticeably in the early 
war years, adding a further economic strain to the Rwandan state and economy. 
 
The Rwandan State collapsed in the middle of 1994 and the RPF rebels formed the core of a 
transition government while the Rwandan army went into exile, mainly in Zairean refugee 
camps.  This explains why the statistics on official government military expenditure show a 
significant dip at the height of conflict in 1994.  Rwanda’s military expenses have remained at 
a more or less constant level since 1996-1997, i.e. double the cost of the army in 1989 
despite the demobilisation of about 18,000 soldiers over the period 1997-2002.  Military 
expenses are related to the Rwandan conflict only up to about 1997-1998, when there 
remained a significant security threat resulting from the so-called ‘forces négatives’ in Zaire. 
However since 1998, the Rwandan military is more engaged in securing resource extraction 
in the DRC and thus military expenditure post-1998 is not directly related to the Rwanda 
conflict under study.  
                                                 
51  K. Kumar et al., 1996, The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience. Study 
4: Rebuilding Post-War Rwanda, Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda. 
52  F.Terry, 2002, Condemned to Repeat? The Paradox of Humanitarian Action, Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press. 
53  Rwandan government estimates as  in SIPRI database for military expenditure. RPF rebel expenditure estimated on the 
basis of the increase in soldiers and military strength on the ground. 
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A few months after the genocide, an arms embargo was imposed on Rwanda, but the 
Security Council only confirmed in June 1995 that the embargo equally applied to the arms 
influx into the camps. From 1995, it becomes difficult to calculate costs for the arming of the 
rebels in Zaire/Congo. $25m is a reliable estimate for 1994, but in subsequent years 
estimates are less reliable. 
 
Table 3: Increase in military expenditure in $m 1994 - 199754
 
 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Transition government -10,8 +15,3 +36,1 +30,1 
Ex-government in camps +25 +20 +20 +15 
Total 36 35 56 45 
Total 2004 prices 43 41 64 51 
 
 
As for the other indicators that can provide us with an indication of the setback of 
development due to the war, it becomes more difficult to separate these from the general 
economic crisis Rwanda was experiencing regardless of the war.  Until the mid 1980's, it had 
done relatively well due to high prices for its main export products (coffee, tea and to a much 
lesser extent tin), and thus high revenues from export sales and taxes.  This all changed 
when world market prices collapsed in the late 1980s.  The price for coffee went down a 
further 30% in the early 1990s, recovered slightly and stabilized thereafter.  All the economic 
indicators were thus bound to go down regardless of the civil war.  
 
Nevertheless, the civil war significantly magnified the problems, because it affected the main 
areas of agricultural production.  Especially since 1992, the effect of the war started to 
outweigh the effect of the general economic crisis.  As the war increased in magnitude, the 
economic indicators went further down.  Therefore it is realistic for the period 1991-1992 to 
ascribe about 75% of the loss in GNP to the war and thereafter about 90%.  
 
Rwanda’s economic recovery since the genocide and the refugee crisis is in many respects 
remarkable, since it invested heavily in rebuilding the capacity for economic management in 
order to restore and maintain macro-economic stability.  Since 1999, Rwanda’s GDP growth 
rate was around 8%.  Food production is back on track, even though food security continues 
to be a problem due to high population pressure on land, which is a structural problem.  By 
1999 not all previous manufacturing industries had restarted at full productive capacity, 
nevertheless output was growing at a very rapid rate of 20%.  The revival of the service 
sector has been the most remarkable, expanding in recent years to include new hotel chains, 
telecom operators, etc.  Fiscal imbalances have been reduced substantially and the currency 
is stable.  The main problem remaining is the cumulated external debt, which is a combined 
result of the conflicts and the structural economic problems remaining.55  The causal relation 
between the war, genocide and GNP post 1999 is thus far less clear.  The overall good 
economic performance of Rwanda has in part been due to a combination of radically shifted 
policy attitude, increased international assistance for economic recovery and the economic 
benefits accruing from Rwanda’s involvement in Congo.  It is perverse, yet possible, to argue 
that all three of these growth-enhancing variables were, to some extent, made possible by 
the previous conflict, which resulted in a radical regime shift.   
                                                 
54  Source: official government figures from the SIPRI database on military expenditure. Several reports have documented the 
arms trafficking surrounding the camps in Zaire, e.g. Human Rights Watch,  Rearming with Impunity. International Support 
for the Perpetrators of the Rwandan Genocide, 1995, Washington DC. 
55  UNDP, October 1999, Development Cooperation Report Rwanda, UNDP: Kigali. 
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On the other hand, some residual costs of the conflict on levels of GNP remained, but they 
became increasingly difficult to separate from structural economic problems and the second 
Congo war.  We assume that the new coalition government that takes office under the peace 
scenario carries out a series of economic reforms, similar in character to those under the 
RPF.  Even so, because of the factors outlined above, the rate of growth in this scenario is 
assumed to be a relatively modest 5% per annum after 1991.  
 
Table 4: Loss of GNP (in $m 2004 prices) 56
 
Year Actual 
GNP 
Projected GNP in 
peace scenario 
Additional GNP in 
peace scenario 
1989   - 
1990   - 
1991 2338 3065 727 
1992 2386 3218 832 
1993 2326 3379 1053 
199457 863 3548 2685 
1995 1444 3726 2282 
1996 1510 3912 2402 
1997 1916 4107 2191 
1998 2114 4313 2199 
1999 2307 4528 2221 
2000 2492 4755 2263 
2001 2691 4993 2302 
2002 2906 5242 2336 
2003 3139 5504 2365 
Total   25858 
 
 
These combined indicators given us an idea of the monetary cost of the conflict to Rwanda. 
However, in order to understand the effect of conflict on the population and the general 
environment, some additional indicators are useful.  n the early war years one of the most 
important cost effects of the war is the shift in public expenditure away from public services 
to the military.  This directly affected poverty levels.  Thus the economic effects of the war 
can also be clearly demonstrated on a micro level.  As aid per capita continued to rise, GNP 
per capita58  has steadily declined (from 368.6 US$ in 1990 to an all time low of 116.6 US$ in 
1994 and an average of  265US$ since 2000).  
                                                 
56  World Bank Statistical Yearbooks. 
57  For 1994, we have estimated that 5% of the cost of conflict is attributed to the civil war and 95% to the genocide. 
58  Source: Jubilee 2000 UK, 2002 HIPC Country Profiles. The GNP per capita has not been calculated as an extra cost of 
conflict above the loss in GNP.
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Table 5: Public expenditure59
 
 1985 1989 1990 1991 1992 
Social services 35% 30% 27% 20% 20% 
Administration and army 45% 49% 57% 61% 64% 
 
 
Table 6: Summary of costs to Rwanda (at $m 2004 prices) 
 
Year Loss of 
national 
income 
Additional 
military 
expenditure 
Infrastructural 
damage 
Other Total 
cost 
due to 
civil war 
Total cost 
due to 
genocide 
1989 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1990 0 90 0 0 90 0 
1991 727 125 26 0 878 0 
1992 691 130 25 0 846 0 
1993 803 123 122 0 1048 0 
199460 2173 43 1193 0 170 3239 
1995 1677 41 0 8 0 1726 
1996 1617 64 0 8 0 1681 
1997 1252 51 0 11 0 1314 
1998 1074 0 0 11 0 1084 
1999 900 0 0 11 0 911 
2000 - - 0 11 0 11 
2001 - - 0 11 0 11 
2002 - - 0 5 0 5 
2003 - - 0 16 0 16 
GRAND TOTALS 3032 9998 
 
 
Other human development costs of the conflict 
 
In addition to the material losses outlined above, the civil war and (especially) the genocide 
had vast consequences on human development.  The most important cost was the loss of 
around 700,000 lives in the genocide and the creation of 2 million refugees.  Even after the 
return home of the refugees some of these problems remain e.g. the 85,000 orphans or the 
increase in female headed households (either due to imprisoned or killed husbands).  The 
diversion of resources into military expenditure, and the disruption created by conflict, also 
had a negative effect on provision of social services, including health and education.  The 
administrative capacity (including judicial services) received a serious blow, even though the 
influx of old caseload Rwandan Tutsi helped to fill public service posts.61  
 
 
                                                 
59  Source: Worldbank, May  1994, Rwanda: Poverty Reduction and Sustainable Growth, Kigali. 
60  For 1994, we have estimated that 5% of the cost of conflict is attributed to the civil war and 95% to the genocide. 
61  The Government of Rwanda, June 2002, Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, Kigali: Ministry of Finance and Planning. 
 51
Rwanda’s HDI showed a serious dip in the most intense period of conflict (1993-1994).  In 
recent years, however, there has been a significant increase in enrolment in primary 
education (albeit with an increasing rate in subsequent dropouts).  While the immediate 
human development costs in terms of lives lost are clear, therefore, the impact on life 
expectancy and educational progress – two of the three components, along with GDP per 
head, of the UNDP’s Human Development Index – is far less clear.  The progress that has 
been made in social provision since the mid to late 1990s is significant, not least a significant 
rise in the HDI.  This appears to be a result, in large measure, of political commitment and 
prioritisation by the current government.  While the RPF dominated government appears to 
have a very technocratic and pragmatic approach to Rwanda’s economic and social 
problems, with positive results both macro-economically and to some degree also in human 
development, this had a cost.  The human rights record of this government is on many 
accounts deplorable (due to the war in Congo but also suppression of opposition in Rwanda).  
Moreover, many of the policies have been delivered in a very top-down style management.  
The forced re-settlement of parts of Rwanda’s population is but one example.62  
 
Table 7: Human Development in Rwanda 1980-200163  
 
 1980 1985 1990 1995 2001 
Human Development Index 0.394 0.405 0.359 0.343 0.422 
Life expectancy 45 
(1970-75) 
   38 
Net Primary enrolment   66%  97% 
Adult literacy (15+)   53%  68% 
Infant mortality, per 1000 births   107  96 
 
 
Additional costs to the neighbouring countries 
 
The additional cost of the conflict to neighbouring countries was very limited up to 1994, 
since the conflict was mainly contained in Rwanda.  Zaire sent 500 troops in 1990 to assist 
the Rwandan army in deflecting the rebel attack.  This operation would have cost in the order 
of $1m.  Burundi and Rwanda have been mutually affected by instability.  However, in this 
period and especially since 1993, Rwanda was probably more affected by problems in 
Burundi than vice versa, as it hosted Burundian refugees.  Zaire and Tanzania have 
contributed to the Arusha Peace Process, but the financial cost of their contribution would 
have been relatively small. 
 
From mid 1994 to end 1996, Burundi, Zaire and Tanzania hosted respectively 85,000, 1.1 
million and 533,000 Rwandan refugees.  The stress on local economic, ecological and 
infrastructural resources has been great.  The biggest cost, humanitarian assistance to 
support the camps, has been carried by the international community.  Other costs have, in 
part, been offset by the influx of emergency aid and other economic opportunities that the 
refugee camps presented (e.g. cheap refugee labour, employment with foreign NGOs)64.  
                                                 
62  See e.g. Saskia Van Hoyweghen, 1999, The urgency of land and agrarian reform in Rwanda, African Affairs 98, pp. 353-
372; Dorothea Hilhorst & Mathijs Van Leeuwen, 2000, Emergence and Development: the Case of Imidugudu, Villagization 
in Rwanda, Journal of Refugee Studies 13, no. 3, pp. 264-280. 
63  Source: UNDP Human Development Report 2003.   
64  B. E. Whitaker, 2002, Refugees in Western Tanzania: The Distribution of Burdens and Benefits Among Local Hosts, 
Journal of Refugee Studies 15, no. 4, pp. 339-358. 
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In fact, cost-benefit analysis of the impact of refugees on host societies is a highly 
controversial matter and the figures represented ($20m, $50m and $50m in 1994, 1995 and 
1996 respectively) are only a very rough estimate of net cost.  In the period 1996 – 1997, 
several neighbouring countries contributed to the Congo war and $100m is a good indication 
of the net cost of these military contributions, made even more uncertain because part of 
these costs were later returned in kind (i.e. access to oil and mineral resources).  Arguably, 
some neighbours might even have made a net profit from the Congo war.  The actual cost of 
the first Congo war to Congo is hard to estimate.  Any data available refer to the period post 
1998, i.e. the second war.  The loss of Congolese civilian life due to the war was limited.  
Though a highly contested figure, UNHCR claimed that around 200,000 Rwandan refugees 
went ‘missing’ when the camps were dismantled.65  No references are available that give an 
indication of impact on local communities.  The civil war that brought Father Kabila to power 
was a blitzkrieg with limited actual military confrontations, in comparison to the second war.  
Plundering of banks and mining companies in the Kivu Provinces took place in order to 
finance the ADFL (Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo), but there is no 
indication about the actual losses to Congo.  Moreover, since there were initially very high 
hopes that the new government under Kabila I would actually be of economic benefit to 
Zaire/Congo, there has been no interest in trying to calculate the cost of the first war. 
 
The heavy price that Congo paid since 1998 is not taken into account here, since the second 
Congo war is not directly related to the Rwanda conflict. 
 
Table 8: Summary of total cost to neighbouring countries ($m) 
 
 1994 1995 1996 1997 
2004 prices 25 60 60 115 
 
Additional direct costs to the wider international community in providing emergency 
assistance 
 
During the civil war, the cost of emergency assistance is almost entirely related to the 
number of IDPs as a result of the conflict.  This cost remained relatively low until 1993, when 
UNHCR had to deal with approximately 500,000 IDPs.  It was only from 1993 that larger 
multilateral initiatives started.  UNHCR’s operation in Rwanda cost $6m in 1993, part of that 
was also for the hosting of Burundian refugees.  WFP started its emergency programme in 
Rwanda in 1993 and spent $53.9m.  
 
Table 9: Humanitarian assistance costs to OECD members66 ($m) 
 
 1990 1991 1992 1993 
Direct humanitarian assistance 2 20 65 100 
2004 prices 2.7 25.6 81.3 122 
 
 
After 1994, humanitarian aid can and should be divided into costs related to the refugees and 
costs related to the reconstruction in Rwanda. Not all estimates makes this distinction, but 
according to the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, in 1994, about one 
                                                 
65  Human Rights Watch , March 1997, “Attacked by All Sides”. Civilians and the War in Eastern Zaire, Human Rights Watch 
Reports 9, no. 1. 
16  Source: A. Baaré, D. Shearer & P. Uvin, 1999, The limits and scope for the use of development incentives and 
disincentives for influencing conflict situations.  The case of Rwanda, Paris: OECD. 
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third of the total expenses related to the genocide was spent in Rwanda as opposed to two 
thirds to the establishment and running of the camps in neighbouring countries.  
 
Once set-up, the figure of $1m / day is a commonly accepted indication for the running costs 
of the combined refugee camps.  Beyond 1996, it becomes increasingly difficult to see which 
expenses were destined for which country as most organisations integrate their costs under 
one Great Lakes operational budget.  We assume here that about half of the Great Lakes 
operational costs were directly related to the Rwanda conflict.  Beyond 1998, we only 
calculate the cost of assistance to residual caseload Rwandan refugees as other emergency 
assistance was related to other conflicts, such as the Burundi conflict. 
 
Table 10: Humanitarian cost related to refugee crisis67 ($m) 
 
 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Cash 800 471 400 150 100 9 9 9 6.5 3.7 
2004 prices 954 550 169 169 111 10 10 10 6.8 3.7 
 
 
France, Belgium and some other Western nations undertook military operations in relation to 
the Rwanda conflict.  Both sent troops immediately after the outbreak of the war in 1990.  
Belgium sent forces in order to evacuate foreigners.  France actively intervened on the side 
of the Rwandan army, arguing that allowing the RPF to continue its offensive would further 
destabilise an already unstable Rwanda.  In hindsight, it has become difficult to see where to 
classify the military expenses of France.  In 1994, Western military forces (including Belgian 
and French paratroopers) intervened in order to evacuate compatriots.  In 1994, France also 
funded almost all of Opération Turquoise ($212m)68, which was a military operation to create 
a safe zone in the South of Rwanda for the displaced population in order to facilitate 
humanitarian access.  The UN redeployed a peacekeeping force, UNAMIR II, until March 
1996.  These costs can hardly be seen as an intervention to stop the conflict, since it was 
over by the time UNAMIR troops arrived.  We therefore added the cost of UNAMIR II to 
military assistance in general, unlike the cost of UNAMIR I (pre-genocide), which can be 
seen as a cost to stop the conflict.  The total cost of UNAMIR was $453.m.  We have split it 
out over the years 1993-1996 according to troop strength on the ground during different 
periods of the operation.  
                                                 
67  J. Eriksson, 1996, The International Response to Conflict and Genocide. Lessons from the Rwandan Experience. 
Synthesis Report, Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda.  www.ocha.org (CAP database) 
68  A. K. Talentino, Failed Prevention: Rwanda, in M.E. Brown & R.N. Rosecrance, 1999, The Costs of Conflict. Prevention 
and Cure in the Global Arena, Lanham & Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield. 
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Table 11: Military assistance and evacuation of compatriots ($m) 
 
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
France69 10 45 45 45 214   
Belgium 2       
Evacuation of foreigners     5   
UNAMIR II     180 180 63.9 
TOTAL 12 45 45 45 399 180 63.9 
2004 prices 16 58 58 58 476 210 73 
 
 
As for the reconstruction of Rwanda, expenses have involved a wide variety of costs: 
material damages, but also support for the justice system, technical support for the 
government, the running of IDP camps, food imports and support for the agricultural sector 
etc.  We have based our totals on a combination of pledged/committed funds during the 
Round Table for Rwanda in 1995 and ODA figures from OECD countries to Rwanda.  From 
1997-1998 most relief operations phase out in favour of development projects and the link 
between those costs and the conflict is no longer so direct.  Since 2000, we assume that 
most aid to Rwanda is development aid, which would have been spent regardless of the 
previous conflict.  Development aid since this date mainly addresses structural economic 
problems such as diversification of exports and reform of the agricultural sector.  
 
Table 12: Reconstruction cost to the international community in Rwanda70 ($m) 
 
 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
 580 523 230 200 150 150 150 
2004 prices 692 611 264 225 167 165 162 
 
Another huge additional cost to the international community has been the cost of bringing the 
perpetrators of the genocide to justice.  Apart from trials financed by bilateral partners, the 
ICTR has cost $200m in the period 1996-1998 and a total of $536m up to date.  The DDRRR 
campaign for soldiers of the former army remaining in Congo is a cost largely paid by the 
international community (mainly the World Bank).  Both these costs continue to be incurred 
up to date and probably for some time in the future as the DDRRR has only just started.  
                                                 
69  Estimates based on a series of articles in Le Monde Diplomatique in 1995. See also: Dérives au Rwanda, October 1995 on 
http://www.réseauvoltaire.net  
 Since Opération Noroît (in October 1990) France contributed an estimated 20 mio FF per year in military and technical 
equipment for the Rwandan army and it maintained a military presence which costed an estimated minimum of 200 mio FF 
per year.  
70  Sources: K. Kumar et al., 1996, The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda 
Experience. Study 4: Rebuilding Post-War Rwanda, Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda; A. Baaré, D. 
Shearer & P. Uvin, 1999, The limits and scope for the use of development incentives and disincentives for influencing 
conflict situations.  The case of Rwanda, Paris: OECD.  www.ocha.org (CAP database) 
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Table 13: Summary of costs of conflict to the international community (in $m 2004 prices) 
 
Year Military 
evacuation / 
assistance 
Hum. 
Assistance 
to sub-
region 
Emergency 
aid and 
reconstr. 
Rwanda 
Justice / 
demobilis-
ation 
Total costs 
incurred 
due to civil 
war 
Total costs 
incurred 
due to 
genocide 
1989 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1990 16 0 2.7 0 18.7 0 
1991 58 0 25.6 0 83.6 0 
1992 58 0 81.3 0 139.3 0 
1993 58 0 122 0 180 0 
199471 476 954 692 0 106 2016 
1995 210 550 611 0 0 1371 
1996 73 459 264 110 0 906 
1997 0 169 225 110 0 504 
1998 0 111 167 110 0 388 
1999 0 10 165 110 0 285 
2000 0 10 162 110 0 282 
2001 0 10 0 110 0 120 
2002 0 6.8 0 116 0 122.8 
2003 0 3.7 0 134 0 137.7 
GRAND TOTAL 527.6 6132.5 
 
 
Additional direct costs to the wider international community in stopping the conflict 
after it has started 
 
The first outside intervention into the Rwandan conflict that was designed to halt it after it 
was started was the Arusha Peace Process in 1992-1993.  This was initially an initiative of 
regional leaders (mainly Tanzania) and the OAU.  Only during the more formal phase of the 
negotiations did the international community become more engaged (the UN only in 1993).  
UNOMUR was deployed in June 1993 and existed out of 81 observers based in Kabale, on 
the Uganda side of the Rwandan border, to observe the ceasefire and prevent arms crossing 
the Rwandan border.  UNAMIR was deployed in October 1993, aimed to help implement the 
Arusha Peace Agreement signed by the Rwandese parties on 4 August 1993.  The total cost 
of UNAMIR up to 1996 was $453.9m and most of this cost is included in the previous section.   
In the period leading up to the genocide, only a part of the total cost was spent, i.e. 
something in the order of $30m maximum.  
                                                 
71  For 1994, we have estimated that 5% of the cost of conflict is attributed to the civil war and 95% to the genocide. 
 56
 
Table 14: Support for the peace process72 ($m) 
 
 1990 1991 1992 1993 
Arusha   2 4 4 
UNOMUR    2,3 
UNAMIR    30 
TOTAL  2 4 36.3 
2004 prices  2.6 5 44.3 
 
 
3.5 PROBABILITY OF THE CONFLICT WITHOUT CONFLICT PREVENTION  
 PACKAGES 
 
The probability of conflict without any conflict prevention measures is 100%. 
 
3.6 CONFLICT PREVENTION PACKAGES 
 
Conflict Prevention Package 1 
 
CP1 is a prevention package designed to terminate the civil war in late 1990, before it 
escalated and before it led to the militarisation / radicalisation of Rwandan society.  Several 
documents mention that if a durable solution had been sought for the problem of the 
Rwandan Tutsi refugees (in exile since the 1960s), the RPF attack on Rwanda would not 
have occurred.73  Yet this does not appear to be the case.  Negotiations for the return of the 
Rwandan diaspora were at an advanced stage in 1990, and both the Rwandan Government 
and the international community were preparing the logistics for an actual return, when the 
RPF attacked.  While a return as civilians might have been acceptable to the bulk of the Tutsi 
exiles, the RPF as a political movement did not want to return as ordinary civilians but 
wanted a share in power.  The Rwandan government wanted the RPF to be dismantled and 
only give a right to return to individuals.74  The outright prevention of the RPF attack was, in 
our opinion, beyond the immediate possibilities of external actors, since the reasons for the 
RPF attack could not have been addressed by external actors.  Nevertheless an adequate 
CP package could have brought the conflict to an end at a much earlier stage. 
 
CP1 would have consisted of a double package of measures:  first, political and security 
measures to discourage participation of key actors in the conflict and provide incentives for a 
peaceful settlement of the dispute;  second, economic measures to discourage participation 
of key actors in the conflict. 
 
                                                 
72  Arusha consisted of several regional meetings between the regional leadership and representatives of the Rwandan 
Government and the RPF. It was smaller in scale than the ongoing Peace Process for Burundi since fewer parties were 
involved. $10m is therefore a very rough estimate only, indicating the order of what this could have costed. A source for a 
more accurate estimate has not been found. 
 Figures for all UN Peacekeeping Operations can be found on http://www.un.org 
73  E.g. P. Wiles, 1992, Rwandese Refugees and Migrants in the Great Lakes Region, December 1992, a report for Oxfam. 
74  See e.g. S. Van Hoyweghen, 2004, Migration and the Nation-State. The Case of Displaced Rwandans in Tanzania, 
forthcoming PhD thesis, University of Leeds. 
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Political and security measures: 
 
The key to this CP Package is the active involvement of the international community in an 
Arusha-style peace process in late 1990 or early 1991, immediately after the RPF attack.  
The cost of support for peace negotiations can be based on the estimated cost of Arusha, 
increased a bit since more Western involvement is presumed.  This political initiative would 
be backed by an arms embargo, which could have prevented both the militarisation of the 
conflict and the negative effect of military expenditure on general poverty levels, including 
France’s provision of military assistance to the Rwandan Government.  It would also have 
been supported by the early deployment of a peacekeeping force in order to control the 
embargo, oversee the peace process and guarantee its implementation.  We are suggesting 
a robust peace keeping force presuming that early negotiations had a higher chance of 
resulting in an effective cease fire.  In addition, the international community would deploy 
civilian personnel to monitor the general human rights situation, thus helping to provide 
essential feed-back to all external actors involved so that policies could have been adjusted 
in time.  An actual field office of the HCHR would probably not be necessary at this point to 
carry out a minimal monitoring and facilitation function.  We have therefore estimated the 
cost of involvement of HCHR on the basis of the cost of a similar involvement in Sierra Leone 
in 1999, which was an average of $0.6m for a 6 month period.75  The cost of the deployment 
of a peacekeeping force similar in strength (around 5,000 troops) to that planned for 
UNAMIR over a period of 3 years, can be based on what UNAMIR eventually cost, though it 
would probably have cost less.  UNAMIR cost $453.9m (October 1993 – March 1996) but 
was never deployed at full strength as planned.  A current UN peace keeping operation with 
similar troop strength is UNMISET in East Timor (annual budget $193.34m, 2004 prices).  
Their mandate is slightly more robust than would have been needed in Rwanda in 1991 and 
the cost is higher because of the involvement of Western troops.  The mandate includes 
security and law enforcement, border control and general stability and justice measures.  
Finally, in the light of the widespread (retrospective) realisation that active promotion of 
democratisation was a destabilizing factor in Rwanda, the package would involve a reining-
back of international community demands in this area. 
  
Economic measures: 
 
The aid business in Rwanda continued to operate in 1990-94 as if the war did not exist.  This 
package assumes that donors altered their economic policies towards Rwanda with the 
potential for conflict much more firmly in their minds.  It includes a small increase in aid, 
designed to soften the social impact of the SAP package, and the devaluation in particular, 
and also to absorb the shock of falling coffee prices.  A number of conditionalities, incentives 
and disincentives would have been built in to prevent the use of aid for the strengthening of a 
radicalising regime and to prevent the use of aid for increased military expenditures (as 
occurred in practice).  It is difficult to assess the cost for these measures, since it was not the 
lack of aid that was necessarily the problem but more the way that it was spent.  An increase 
of about $50m per annum (1990 prices) would be sufficient to cover the measures proposed, 
although this amount is slightly increased towards the end of the peace keeping presence in 
order to act as an incentive for continued moderation. 
                                                 
75 Source: OHCHR Annual Report 2000, Geneva. 
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Table 15: Estimated cost of CP1 to the International Community ($m at 2004 prices) 
 
Year Peacekeeping Negotiations HR monitoring Economic support TOTAL
1989 0 0 0 0 0 
1990 153 9.3 1.1 66.4 77 
1991 153 9.3 1.6 66.4 230 
1992 153 0 1.6 66.4 221 
1993 0 0 1.6 66.4 221 
1994 0 0 1.6 79.7 81 
1995 0 0 1.1 79.7 81 
1996 0 0 1.1 79.7 81 
1997 0 0 0 0 0 
1998 0 0 0 0 0 
1999 0 0 0 0 0 
2000 0 0 0 0 0 
2001 0 0 0 0 0 
2002 0 0 0 0 0 
2003 0 0 0 0 0 
GRAND TOTAL 992 
 
 
Conflict Prevention Package 2 
 
CP2 is a straightforward prevention package that could have terminated the genocide where 
it started, i.e. the capital Kigali, before it spread to the rest of the country.  It involves a 
military intervention, but without any additional economic support element.  This package 
would have obstructed any further plans of the extremist interim government and thus not 
only have prevented the mass killing, but also the subsequent destruction of the country and 
the refugee crisis.  All that was lacking was in fact the political will to intervene.  As General 
Dallaire (head of UNAMIR) pointed out, all he needed was a mandate and the men that were 
supposed to be deployed (i.e. 5000 instead of 2500).76  The international community, or at 
least those contributing troops, would have had to be prepared to accept the risk of 
casualties among their troops.  It can even be argued that extra personnel were not needed 
as several countries sent elite troops to evacuate compatriots without intervening in the 
killings they were witnessing.77  This was pointed out by several experts at the Belgian 
Parliamentary Enquiry into the Rwandan genocide, but we conservatively assume here that 
the force required would be in addition to those forces actually deployed for other purposes.  
 
This crisis intervention would have solved the genocide and its aftermath, but would not have 
addressed the root causes of conflict or the war.  Nor would it have meant an immediate 
return to the peace and stability of the pre-1990 period.  A continued engagement from a 
peacekeeping force overseeing the implementation of a relaunched Arusha Accord, together 
with the installation of the transition government that emerged from this process, would 
therefore have been necessary for a period of about four years (mid-1994 to mid-1997). 
Thereafter, the international community would have continued to make clear its readiness to 
intervene again if a future threat of genocide emerged.  
 
                                                 
76  R. Dallaire, 2003, Shake Hands with the Devil. The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda, Random House of Canada. 
77  J.-C. Willame, 1997, Les Belges au Rwanda. Le Parcours de la Honte, Brussels: GRIP. 
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The forces on standby for ONUMOZ, i.e. the UN Operation in Mozambique (December 1992- 
December 1994), provides a good basis for estimating the cost of a similar operation in 
Rwanda, since the mandate and troop strength were similar to what would have been 
needed in Rwanda.  A peace keeping force in Rwanda would have equally needed to 
separate and disarm fighting forces, locate and destroy weapons.  They would equally 
needed to have safeguarded access for humanitarian actors, provided and co-ordinated 
technical assistance and overseen the implementation of the peace agreement and the 
installation of a new government.  We are therefore looking at a total cost of $850m (1994 
prices) spread over a period of 4 years.  This is in the same order as Renner’s estimate.  He 
estimated that a 6 month peacekeeping force in 1994 at a cost of ‘just’ $115m could have 
prevented the genocide.78  Talentino arrives at a CP package of $4,500m, i.e. well above our 
estimate.79  She estimates the cost of the military force higher because of the need to 
engage in combat in 1994.  However, we believe no high tech weaponry was needed and 
that this cost would have disappeared in the following years.  Her peace scenario also differs 
in the sense that she proposes a very extensive humanitarian and economic aid package in 
order to arrive at a situation of relative peace and stability.  This is a question of perspective.  
By looking at the period 1990-1993 and its related cost, it is clear that the staggering 
increase in the cost of conflict after 1994 is directly attributable to the acts of genocide and 
not the general context of instability and civil war.  A mere military intervention plus extended 
peacekeeping force would have prevented the great majority of these costs. 
 
Given the particular context of instability, the installation of a field office of the HCHR could 
supplement the peace force.  The cost of the HCHR field office in Burundi ($2,3m in 1999) is 
relevant for comparison since the context and tasks are very similar to what would have been 
needed in Rwanda in 1994.  The field office could be maintained in place for a longer period 
than the peace-keeping force as a close monitoring agent. 
 
                                                 
78  M.Renner, November 1994, Budgeting for Disarmament: The Costs of War and Peace, Worldwatch Paper no. 122., 
Washington: Worldwatch Institute. 
79  A. K. Talentino, Failed Prevention: Rwanda, in M.E. Brown & R.N. Rosecrance, 1999, The Costs of Conflict. Prevention 
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Table 16: Estimated cost of CP2 to the international community ($m at 2004 prices) 
 
Year Peace enforcing / keeping HR monitoring TOTAL 
1989 0 0 0 
1990 0 0 0 
1991 0 0 0 
1992 0 0 0 
1993 0 0 0 
1994 268.4 1.5 269.9 
1995 298.3 2.5 300.8 
1996 298.3 2.5 300.8 
1997 149.1 2.5 151.6 
1998 0 1.5 1.5 
1999 0 1.5 1.5 
2000 0 0 0 
2001 0 0 0 
2002 0 0 0 
2003 0 0 0 
GRAND TOTAL 1026.1 
 
3.7 PROBABILITY OF CONFLICT WITH CONFLICT PREVENTION PACKAGES 
 
Probability of Conflict with Conflict Prevention Package 1 
 
There is general agreement that the 1992-1993 Arusha Peace Process was technically 
sophisticated and that little more could have been done to make it work.  However, it came in 
many respects too late, and as a result it was never accepted by all the parties to the conflict.  
After considerable military advances during 1991 and 1992, the RPF used its military 
strength on the ground as a negotiating chip for getting the most out of the Arusha process.  
This threat was considered unacceptable by a growing proportion of those in government 
and no agreement was reached.  
 
The effect of CP1 on the likelihood of avoiding this escalation is difficult to estimate since 
several scenarios are possible.  It is possible that less military support for the Rwandan army 
in October 1990 might have led to an outright capture of Kigali by the RPF in 1990, with 
unpredictable consequences.  Nevertheless, such an outcome is not certain.  Taking into 
account the pre-existing general instability in Rwanda (economic crisis, democratisation 
process, etc.) it is quite possible that some level of renewed violence would have broken out 
regardless in subsequent years.  The economic initiatives suggested in the package could 
have reduced this probability but not eliminated it.  
 
As a consequence of these various factors, we estimate that CP1 would only have reduced 
the likelihood of a 1990-1993 scale civil war taking place, sometime before 2003, to about 
50%.  However we estimate that this package would have had a much greater impact on the 
risk of a genocide taking place, which we estimate would only have been 10% with this 
package.  Of the total costs of the Rwandan conflict, 82% is attributable to the genocide 
(which accounts for 92% of the costs to the international community, 100% of those to 
neighbours and 77% to Rwanda itself).  
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As a consequence, the reduction in probability of conflict (weighted by the relative costs of 
the various parts of that conflict to the international community, neighbours and Rwanda 
combined) is estimated to be 83%.  
 
Probability of Conflict with Conflict Prevention Package 2 
 
CP2 would have been a relatively straightforward intervention, isolating the already known 
masterminds of the genocide and keeping militia in check in the capital.  Given the necessary 
resources, the likelihood that the genocide could have been prevented would have been very 
high.  In the short term, and as long as a sizeable international force was present, we assess 
the probability of success as 95%.  Provided that a credible threat of re-intervention 
remained even after UN forces departed in 1998, moreover, the chances of genocide taking 
place in subsequent years would have remained low.  If CP2 had been implemented, the 
cumulative probability of genocide taking place during 1994-2003 is therefore assessed at 
only 5%.  
 
In this scenario, the costs of the civil war would not have been prevented.  However, since 
these costs constitute only 18% of the total costs of the Rwanda conflict (only 8% of costs to 
the international community, practically 0% of those incurred by neighbouring countries and 
23% of costs to Rwanda), the reduction in probability of conflict (weighted by the relative 
costs of various parts of that conflict to the international community, neighbours and Rwanda 
combined) would be 78%. 
 
3.8 NET PRESENT VALUE AND ASSESSMENT 
 
We conclude that both CP packages studied would have had to reduce the probability of 
conflict by around 15% in order to be cost-effective for the IC.  If the costs to Rwanda itself 
are also taken into account, the breakeven probability would have been much lower, at 
around 3%.  In both calculations, therefore, conflict prevention statistically stood a very good 
chance of saving money. 
 
If one were to try to make a choice between the two packages under study many other 
factors would need to be taken into account.  Package 1 which essentially argues for early 
international engagement at the very onset of conflict (in contrast to Package 2 which 
supposes robust military intervention when conflict threatens to escalate to unacceptably 
high levels) seems to be the obvious choice, in terms of cost effectiveness, the expectation 
of an overall higher success rate and (last but not least) the human costs of the civil war.  
However, we equally have to realise that in 1990 no-one would have expected the initial RPF 
incursion into Rwanda to have the wider ramifications it eventually did.  No-one could have 
predicted the genocide at that point, let alone the refugee saga and the first Congo war.  
Moreover, since in 1990-91 it would have been difficult to predict the further evolvement of 
the actual conflict scenario, it would have been more difficult for external actors to get a grip 
on the situation.  As a result, we estimate that there would still have remained a 50% chance 
of the civil war happening despite the implementation of the suggested CP package.  These 
handicaps have to be taken into account when evaluating it. 
 
CP Package 2 is a more straightforward package since the conflict had evolved to the extent 
that it became more predictable to external actors so that decisive action at the right moment 
stood a very high chance of stopping the genocide and all its related costs.  However, this 
would imply that Rwanda had already suffered from the war for several years.  While the 
economic costs of the war are low, the social and political cost of the war on Rwanda’s future 
stability should not be underestimated, even though they have not been taken into account 
here.  Reconciliation would be harder than in the case of Package 1, and so would the 
formation of a coalition government acceptable to all.  It can be argued that a Rwandan 
government formed after implementation of Package 2 would have had the added bonus of 
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the RPF weighing more heavily on the macro-economic management of Rwanda and having 
a positive effect on trying to solve some of Rwanda’s structural economic problems, which 
had remained unaddressed until then.  However, once again, we should not only look at 
economic indicators.  The RPF is an elite minority that dominates policy and has a poor 
human rights record both within Rwanda and in neighbouring Congo.  Hence, in terms of 
national and regional political stability, it might have been better to have had a Rwandan 
government resulting from an implementation of Package 1 which would have given the RPF 
a much smaller share in power (because it would not have had the time to prove itself on the 
battle field).  Such a coalition would have been more acceptable to the Rwandan political 
establishment of the time and could therefore have prevented the radicalisation within circles 
of the Rwandan political elite. 
 
The broad conclusions reached here are not substantially influenced by varying the costs of 
the two Packages.  Even if the costs of additional economic support included in Package 1 
are doubled (which we do not think would have been necessary), this Package would still 
have been cost-effective to the IC at a breakeven probability of success of 24%.  Similarly, a 
larger military force might plausibly have been required in Package 2 in order to follow 
through on the immediate task of halting the genocide in Kigali.  If the costs of such a force 
had been three times those included above, for example, the breakeven probability of cost-
effectiveness to the IC would have been 46%: still well below the near-certainty of success 
which the study suggests would have been achieved with a smaller force.  In both cases, the 
breakeven probability is much lower once the costs of the conflict and genocide to the 
Rwandan people is taken into account.  
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